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The	  world	  is	  becoming	  flat.	  With	  the	  progress	  of	  globalization	  and	  world	  integration,	  the	  
past	  century	  has	  witnessed	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  emerging	  and	  reemerging	  diseases.	  It	  has	  
become	  a	  common	  concern	  the	  world	  will	  face	  a	  deadly	  infectious	  disease	  pandemic	  and	  
the	  international	  community	  needs	  to	  set	  up	  a	  functional	  system	  to	  face	  up	  the	  challenge.	  
Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  outbreaks	  of	  SARS,	  H5N1	  and	  H1N1	  pandemic	  have	  raised	  concern	  
among	  public	  health	  officials	  and	  the	  public	  in	  general	  on	  the	  need	  of	  global	  and	  local	  
pandemic	  control.	  Infectious	  agents	  have	  been	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  dramatic	  
population	  flow,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  advance	  in	  transportation,	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  every	  inch	  of	  
land	  on	  the	  planet.	  Diseases	  no	  longer	  respect	  nation	  boundaries	  and	  no	  single	  country	  are	  
able	  to	  handle	  infectious	  epidemics.	  All	  has	  pointed	  to	  an	  urgent	  need	  of	  better	  governance	  
in	  globalized	  infectious	  disease	  transmission.	  As	  complex	  as	  the	  epidemic	  itself,	  infectious	  
disease	  control	  presents	  significant	  governance	  challenges.	  World	  Health	  Organization	  
(WHO)	  is	  created	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  be	  a	  world	  governor	  of	  health.	   	   However	  in	  this	  
post-­‐Westphalia	  international	  regime,	  states	  still	  have	  the	  residual	  power	  in	  governance	  
and	  without	  a	  real	  functioning	  world	  government,	  the	  role	  of	  WHO	  as	  a	  leader	  in	  
controlling	  global	  infectious	  diseases	  is	  limited.	  It	  is	  thus	  crucial	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  
how	  nation	  states	  and	  WHO	  should	  place	  themselves	  in	  the	  architecture	  of	  global	  
epidemics	  control.	  This	  paper	  will	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  nation	  states	  and	  global	  health	  
agencies,	  taking	  China	  and	  WHO	  as	  respective	  examples,	  in	  preparedness	  and	  response	  to	  
the	  SARS	  epidemics.	  It	  will	  further	  compare	  the	  specific	  strengthens	  of	  each	  player	  in	  
containing	  global	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  under	  a	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme.	  
INTRODUCTION	  
Infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  and	  global	  epidemics	   	  
For	  centuries,	  infectious	  diseases	  have	  been	  great	  burden	  of	  global	  health	  with	  new	  
diseases	  emerging	  and	  old	  ones	  resurging.	  (Binder	  et	  al,	  1999)	  The	  world	  population	  were	  
affected	  by	  more	  than	  300	  infectious	  diseases	  emerged	  between	  1940	  and	  2004.	  (Jones	  et	  
al,	  2008)	  According	  to	  WHO,	  infectious	  diseases	  accounted	  for	  26%	  of	  the	  total	  global	  
mortality	  in	  2001,	  which	  indicated	  a	  number	  of	  around	  14.7	  million	  deaths	  from	  hundreds	  
of	  communicable	  diseases	  known	  and	  unknown.	  (WHO,	  2003)	  Epidemics	  are	  rampant	  
throughout	  human	  history	  and	  they	  have	  generated	  some	  of	  the	  most	  catastrophic	  events.	  
Black	  Death	  eliminated	  a	  third	  of	  the	  European	  population	  during	  the	  14th	  century	  and	  the	  
1918	  flu	  killed	  nearly	  a	  hundred	  million	  people.	  Infectious	  diseases	  have	  devastating	  
impacts,	  more	  serious	  and	  powerful	  than	  other	  human	  disasters	  such	  as	  wars.	  As	  
documented,	  the	  1918	  flu	  pandemic	  killed	  more	  Americans	  in	  a	  single	  year	  than	  the	  total	  
amount	  of	  death	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	  
1Being	  contagious	  illnesses,	  these	  diseases	  have	  posed	  a	  considerable	  threat	  to	  human	  
survival	  and	  caused	  massive	  social	  anxiety.	  Under	  certain	  circumstances	  with	  unmanaged	  
disease	  transmission	  and	  public	  panic,	  fear	  grows	  as	  fast	  as	  the	  disease	  itself	  will	  cause	  
abrupt	  and	  serious	  social	  disturbance.	  With	  the	  advantage	  of	  modern	  medicine,	  optimists	  
have	  anticipated	  that	  we	  will	  need	  to	  face	  the	  threat	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  not	  far	  in	  the	  
future.	  However,	  the	  development	  of	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  resurgence	  of	  old	  
ones	  make	  us	  realize	  that	  the	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  global	  epidemics	  are	  not	  “just	  a	  
matter	  of	  history”.	  (Selgelid,	  2005)	   	  
An	  infectious	  disease	  outbreak	  is	  “the	  occurrence	  of	  unusually	  large	  or	  unexpected	  number	  
of	  cases	  of	  a	  disease,	  known	  or	  unknown	  for	  a	  given	  place	  and	  time.	  “2	   When	  diseases	  
transmit	  within	  a	  small	  community	  or	  confined	  group	  of	  people,	  it	  is	  a	  localized	  event	  but	  if	  
the	  infectious	  agents	  have	  superior	  communicable	  capacity,	  more	  severe	  and	  disturbing	  
pandemic	  can	  occur.	  Transmitting	  from	  person	  to	  person	  or	  from	  non-­‐human	  hosts	  to	  
humans,	  diseases	  can	  spread	  extremely	  rapidly	  within	  days	  or	  even	  hours,	  and	  in	  such	  a	  
state	  of	  emergency,	  time	  is	  getting	  short	  for	  response.	  This	  often	  leads	  to	  high	  morbidity	  
and	  mortality	  rates.	  
Minor	  outbreaks	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  occur	  all	  around	  the	  world	  every	  day.	  Although	  not	  
serious,	  most	  of	  them	  still	  deserve	  attention	  from	  the	  international	  community.	  New	  
diseases	  have	  been	  reported	  to	  appear	  at	  a	  consistent	  rate	  of	  one	  per	  year	  for	  the	  past	  30	  
years.	  (Zacher	  &	  Keefe,	  2011,	  p.	  43)	  Many	  of	  them	  are	  neither	  treatable	  nor	  curable.	  
Prevention	  and	  containment	  methods	  are	  often	  unknown.	  Microbial	  pathogens	  have	  the	  
ability	  and	  potential	  to	  evolve	  and	  become	  a	  killer	  pandemic.	  The	  increased	  risk	  of	  disease	  
outbreaks	  will	  have	  a	  devastating	  global	  impact,	  combining	  with	  other	  nonmedical	  factors	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Gina	  Kolata,	  “Flu:	  The	  Story	  of	  the	  Great	  Influenza	  Pandemic	  of	  1918	  and	  the	  Search	  for	  the	  Virus	  That	  
Caused	  It.	  http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/k/kolata-­‐flu.html	  
2	   World	  Health	  Organization.	  Outbreaks	  Control.	  
http://www.who.int/infectious-­‐disease-­‐news/.../4_Outbreak_control.pdf	   	  
such	  as	  international	  travel	  and	  transportation.	  As	  these	  factors	  become	  prevalent,	  it	  is	  for	  
sure	  that	  we	  will	  have	  to	  endure	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  global	  epidemics.	   	  
Complexities	  of	  governance	  of	  global	  infectious	  disease	  epidemics	  
Infectious	  diseases	  are	  emerging	  in	  the	  increasingly	  global	  context	  of	  commercial	  and	  trade	  
activities.	  The	  response	  to	  these	  kinds	  of	  diseases	  is	  becoming	  global	  as	  well,	  with	  national	  
institutions,	  international	  organizations	  and	  other	  groups	  coordinating	  their	  efforts	  to	  
prevent	  and	  control	  the	  transmission	  of	  these	  diseases.	  Global	  governance	  of	  infectious	  
diseases	  has	  received	  growing	  attention	  as	  people	  realize	  that	  no	  single	  country	  can	  handle	  
the	  global	  epidemics	  alone.	   	  
However	  building	  an	  optimal	  global	  health	  governance	  system	  is	  not	  easy	  task.	  Whenever	  
and	  wherever	  an	  outbreak	  occurs,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  detect	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  and	  to	  get	  it	  
under	  control	  so	  that	  we	  can	  ultimately	  save	  lives	  of	  people	  at	  risk.	  From	  a	  public	  health	  
perspective,	  the	  basic	  principles	  behind	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  preventive	  and	  control	  measures	  
are	  fairly	  straightforward:	  prepare,	  detect	  and	  respond.	  However	  in	  practice,	  infectious	  
disease	  outbreaks	  are	  more	  of	  a	  social	  problem	  rather	  than	  pure	  public	  health	  concerns	  
due	  to	  its	  complex	  relationship	  with	  of	  ethics,	  politics	  and	  economic	  interests.	  (Osterholm,	  
2005)	  
Global	  governance	  of	  infectious	  disease	  transmission	  is	  being	  shaped	  by	  two	  broad	  sets	  of	  
trends,	  one	  characterized	  by	  the	  evolution	  of	  microbial	  agents	  and	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  
disease	  transmission	  in	  a	  globalized	  world,	  the	  other	  by	  the	  gradually	  reshaped	  perception	  
of	  epidemics	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  global	  public	  governance	  in	  the	  current	  international	  
arena.	  (Jones	  and	  et	  al,	  2008)	  
It	  has	  been	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  in	  recent	  year,	  we	  are	  enduring	  an	  increasing	  treat	  
from	  infectious	  diseases.	  As	  noted	  by	  the	  former	  Director	  of	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  Dr.	  
Brundtland,	  “in	  an	  interdependent	  world,	  bacteria	  and	  viruses	  travel	  almost	  as	  fast	  as	  
e-­‐mail	  and	  financial	  flows.”	  (Brundtland,	  2003)	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  microbial	  world	  is	  
complex	  and	  constantly	  evolving.	  Infectious	  disease	  agents	  and	  vectors	  take	  their	  own	  path	  
to	  multiply,	  mutate,	  migrate	  and	  adapt	  to	  new	  hosts	  and	  habitats.	  Year	  by	  year,	  the	  
presence	  of	  unstable	  and	  unknown	  viruses	  and	  bacteria	  strains	  remains	  a	  dangerous	  factor	  
of	  another	  lethal	  pandemic.	   	  
Moreover,	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  infectious	  diseases	  is	  prevailing,	  accompanied	  with	  the	  high	  
speed	  and	  volume	  of	  international	  trade	  and	  travel.	  Globalization	  has	  become	  dominant	  
forces	  in	  reshaping	  public	  health	  at	  both	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels.	  (Salgado,	  
2010)	  As	  people	  began	  to	  travel	  and	  trade,	  the	  microorganisms	  and	  infectious	  diseases	  they	  
harbored	  traveled	  with	  them.	  Transoceanic	  air	  travel	  allows	  microorganisms	  to	  move	  from	  
country	  to	  country	  and	  provides	  them	  with	  a	  propitious	  environment	  to	  incubate	  and	  
spread.	  Time	  for	  traveling	  from	  coast	  to	  coast	  is	  even	  less	  than	  the	  incubation	  period	  for	  
many	  infectious	  diseases.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  cut	  in	  distance,	  the	  world	  today	  is	  more	  
interconnected	  by	  means	  of	  transportation	  and	  faster	  communication.	  The	  globalization	  of	  
the	  world’s	  political	  economy	  and	  infectious	  disease	  are	  accelerating	  inseparably.	  (Aginam,	  
2004)	  As	  modern	  transformations	  in	  international	  commerce,	  transportation,	  and	  human	  
migration	  has	  become	  commonplace,	  the	  opportunities	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  killer	  
pandemic,	  provided	  by	  the	  component	  have	  been	  numerous.	  (Stern	  and	  Markel	  2004)New	  
frameworks	  of	  international	  economy	  and	  changing	  patterns	  of	  human	  behavior	  have	  
created	  new	  challenges	  as	  well	  as	  opportunities	  for	  global	  governance	  of	  infectious	  
diseases.	   	  
ANALYTICAL	  FRAMEWORK:	  WHO	  IS	  IN	  CHARGE	  OF	  GLOBAL	  EPIDEMICS	  
CONTROL?	  SHARED	  HEALTH	  GOVERNANCE	  SCHEME	  
Governance	  does	  matter	  in	  outbreaks	  and	  epidemics	  control.	  As	  noted	  by	  Southwood	  
Smith	  nearly	  200	  years	  ago,	  “Epidemics	  are	  under	  our	  own	  control;	  we	  may	  promote	  their	  
spread;	  we	  may	  prevent	  it;	  we	  may	  secure	  ourselves	  for	  them.”	  (Quah,	  2007,	  p.	  11)	  
Nevertheless	  history	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  epidemics	  control	  can	  be	  difficult,	  and	  success	  
only	  comes	  after	  trials	  and	  errors.	  Fast-­‐paced	  and	  interconnected	  lives	  have	  resulted	  in	  
diseases	  transmitting	  at	  a	  quicker	  tempo	  and	  lead	  to	  intensified	  crisis	  of	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  
infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  and	  conducting	  effective	  control	  measures	  in	  each	  public	  
health	  emergency	  situation.	   	  
A	  great	  variety	  of	  theories	  has	  been	  used	  to	  frame	  global	  health	  governance,	  most	  of	  which	  
customize	  general	  international	  relations	  ideologies.	  However,	  current	  global	  health	  
governance	  literature	  suffers	  in	  description	  and	  analytical	  capacity	  of	  global	  infectious	  
disease	  epidemics	  policy,	  presenting	  an	  unmanaged	  governance	  structure	  with	  roles	  of	  
players,	  in	  particular	  nation	  states	  and	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO),	  mixed	  and	  not	  
clearly	  defined.	  (Ricci,	  2009)	   	  
This	  paper	  is	  supposed	  to	  take	  the	  SARS	  epidemic	  in	  2003	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  to	  clarify	  the	  role	  
Chinese	  government	  and	  WHO,	  played	  in	  the	  alarming	  emergency	  and	  apply	  concepts	  of	  
shared	  health	  governance	  to	  analyze	  whether	  they	  had	  fulfilled	  their	  responsibilities	  solidly.	  
The	  study	  would	  provide	  specific	  insights	  into	  rational	  allocation	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  
national	  governments	  and	  international	  health	  agencies	  in	  global	  infectious	  disease	  
epidemics	  control.	  
Literature	  Review:	  Theories	  of	  Global	  Health	  Governance	  in	  History	  and	  Gaps	  in	  
Frameworks	  of	  Global	  Epidemics	  Control	  
Governance	  is	  a	  concept	  traditionally	  referring	  primarily	  to	  the	  operations	  and	  actions	  of	  
corporations	  and	  state	  governments.	  Back	  in	  the	  past	  when	  states	  were	  geographically	  
isolated,	  governance	  was	  a	  confined	  concept	  of	  states	  holding	  managerial	  authority	  over	  
local	  communities.	  However,	  in	  a	  globalized	  world	  where	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  international	  
actors	  are	  playing	  pivotal	  roles	  in	  issues	  shared	  by	  countries	  and	  regions,	  discussions	  of	  
governance	  today	  must	  address	  the	  roles	  of	  a	  coalition	  of	  national	  and	  transnational	  
players.	  (Quah,	  2007,	  p.	  11)	  
In	  the	  realm	  of	  health,	  there	  have	  been	  several	  theoretical	  frameworks	  to	  study	  global	  
health	  governance.	  Unfortunately,	  as	  complex	  as	  the	  currently	  crowded	  global	  health	  
architecture	  itself,	  work	  in	  the	  area	  is	  “uncoordinated”	  and	  “fragmented”	  with	  mixed	  
results	  and	  impacts.	  (Ruger,	  2010;	  Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  Given	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  infectious	  
disease	  transmission	  and	  the	  complex	  state	  of	  world	  epidemics	  control	  in	  modern	  society,	  
most	  of	  these	  frameworks	  are	  deficient	  in	  illuminating	  a	  global	  health	  governance	  structure	  
which	  is	  sustainable	  and	  has	  direct	  implications	  for	  legal	  and	  actionable	  measures,	  leaving	  
much	  to	  be	  desired.	   	  
The	  realist	  and	  neorealist	  perspectives	  on	  global	  governance	  put	  emphasis	  on	  national	  
survival	  and	  geopolitical	  interests.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  It	  frames	  international	  relations	  and	  
global	  governance	  as	  an	  arena	  in	  which	  self-­‐interests	  are	  the	  primary	  motivation	  for	  
international	  politics	  and	  cooperation.	  It	  prompts	  a	  “rational	  actor	  model”	  for	  current	  
global	  health	  governance	  regime	  and	  nation	  states	  constantly	  balance	  between	  costs	  and	  
benefits	  of	  cooperation	  with	  the	  international	  community	  or	  compliances	  with	  a	  series	  of	  
international	  standards.	  (Ruger,	  2011)	  Cost	  of	  this	  interests-­‐oriented	  approach	  can	  be	  
extremely	  high	  as	  failing	  to	  respond	  to	  an	  infectious	  epidemic	  can	  be	  terribly	  dangerous.	  No	  
one	  can	  afford	  millions	  of	  deaths	  similar	  to	  what	  had	  happened	  in	  the	  1918	  flu	  pandemic.	  
Any	  disclaimer	  or	  failure	  of	  any	  actors	  due	  to	  self-­‐interests	  can	  lead	  to	  devastating	  impacts.	  
(Yach,	  1998a)	  We	  have	  already	  got	  a	  bit	  in	  our	  centuries-­‐long	  struggle	  against	  cholera,	  
which	  unfortunately	  seems	  not	  end	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  It	  is	  estimated	  by	  WHO	  that	  
currently	  there	  are	  3	  to	  5	  million	  cholera	  cases	  and	  almost	  100,000	  deaths	  due	  to	  cholera	  
every	  year.	  With	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  medicine,	  cholera	  should	  not	  be	  a	  terror	  
anymore.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  treat	  if	  one	  knows	  how	  and	  can	  respond	  quickly.	  For	  cholera,	  time	  
and	  speed	  matters	  and	  early	  action	  is	  crucial.	  However	  until	  now	  it	  is	  still	  almost	  
impossible.	  Governments	  often	  cover	  up	  the	  outbreaks	  or	  delay	  responses	  to	  invite	  
international	  investigation,	  fearing	  stigma	  or	  loss	  of	  tourism	  and	  trade,	  which	  have	  
sustained	  as	  primary	  concerns	  of	  many	  developing	  countries.3	   This	  self-­‐interest	  based	  
model	  offers	  nation-­‐states	  an	  excuse	  to	  escape	  from	  its	  moral	  obligations.	  Even	  with	  
cholera,	  for	  which	  evidence-­‐based	  control	  measures	  are	  well	  developed	  and	  most	  
accessible,	  success	  of	  containing	  the	  disease	  becomes	  impossible	  under	  actors’	  constant	  
“cold”	  self-­‐interest	  calculation.	  The	  extraordinary	  penetrating	  capacity	  of	  various	  infectious	  
agents	  has	  made	  the	  cost	  of	  any	  delayed	  or	  failed	  responses	  too	  high	  to	  afford.	  A	  normative	  
framework	  should	  serve	  as	  the	  premium	  for	  any	  other	  common	  and	  collective	  actions	  
between	  nation	  states	  and	  international	  agencies,	  to	  address	  the	  importance	  and	  urgency	  
of	  controlling	  epidemics	  as	  well	  as	  ethical	  requirements	  to	  be	  liable	  in	  fighting	  global	  
infectious	  disease	  outbreaks.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  realistic	  and	  neorealist	  schools	  of	  thoughts	  
fail	  to	  give	  us.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  ethical	  concerns,	  from	  a	  managerial	  perspective,	  the	  rationale	  actor	  
model	  conspires	  against	  authentic	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	  between	  different	  actors.	  
Management	  of	  global	  infectious	  disease	  epidemics	  is	  a	  true	  grand	  challenge	  not	  only	  
because	  resources	  required	  to	  successfully	  contain	  an	  epidemic	  can	  be	  unexpectedly	  
enormous	  but	  also	  because	  without	  concerted	  and	  combined	  efforts,	  success	  will	  not	  come.	  
Every	  single	  player,	  whether	  individuals,	  state	  health	  agencies,	  pharmaceutical	  supplies	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   “Saving	  lives	  in	  the	  time	  of	  cholera”,	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  2012	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international	  institutions,	  must	  continue	  with	  its	  reliability	  and	  dedicate	  to	  their	  lines	  of	  
governance	  to	  avoid	  the	  short	  board	  effect.	  The	  communicable	  features	  of	  infectious	  
diseases	  make	  this	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game:	  we	  will	  succeed	  only	  if	  combined	  and	  concerted	  
actions	  are	  committed.	  Any	  single	  tiny	  hole	  in	  the	  bucket	  of	  global	  epidemics	  control	  will	  
cost	  us	  a	  tragic	  loss.	  In	  the	  rationale	  actor	  model,	  however,	  everyone	  focuses	  on	  individual	  
losses	  and	  gains,	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  come	  up	  with	  overarching	  principles.	  Without	  a	  
guidance	  to	  delineate	  components	  of	  success,	  no	  one	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  and	  what	  
ought	  to	  be	  done	  and	  it	  complicates	  cooperation	  among	  different	  actors.	  Inexplicit	  order	  
and	  adoption	  of	  anarchy	  will	  lead	  to	  duplicated	  efforts,	  conflicted	  agendas	  and	  
contradicted	  standards.	  During	  an	  infectious	  disease	  outbreak,	  failure	  to	  recognize	  
legitimate	  institutions	  to	  establish	  a	  solid	  case	  definition	  will	  make	  future	  efforts	  of	  track	  
and	  control	  virtually	  impossible.	  
Moreover,	  from	  a	  realist	  or	  neorealist	  perspective,	  states	  are	  the	  principal	  actors	  and	  
international	  institutions	  are	  just	  place	  where	  powerful	  states	  pursue	  interests	  through	  
dialogue	  and	  balance	  of	  power.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  The	  crucial	  role	  of	  states	  in	  the	  realist	  
or	  neorealist	  framework	  overlooks	  the	  increasing	  importance,	  independent	  authority	  and	  
legitimacy	  of	  other	  actors	  in	  particular	  global	  agencies.	  Authorities	  are	  located	  in	  territories	  
rather	  than	  functional	  categories.	  States	  are	  the	  only	  reserved	  resources	  of	  providing	  
health	  to	  their	  citizens.	  It	  has	  undermined	  the	  authority	  of	  those	  global	  actors,	  especially	  
World	  Health	  Organization	  in	  filling	  the	  void	  of	  states’	  failures	  and	  providing	  support	  for	  
surging	  demands	  during	  public	  health	  emergencies.	  In	  epidemic	  emergencies	  with	  an	  
explosion	  of	  cases,	  even	  the	  most	  prepared	  states	  can	  get	  shorthanded	  due	  to	  
exceptionally	  increased	  demand	  of	  health	  services	  and	  corresponding	  resources	  required	  to	  
tackle	  the	  disease	  outbreak.	  When	  outside	  assistance	  is	  in	  absolute	  need,	  the	  realist	  and	  
neorealist	  framework	  not	  only	  limits	  the	  possibility	  of	  assistance	  from	  other	  countries	  since	  
from	  the	  realist	  and	  neorealist	  schools	  of	  thoughts,	  powerful	  states	  are	  not	  “meaningfully	  
accountable”	  to	  others.	  It	  has	  also	  disregarded	  the	  role	  of	  international	  agencies	  in	  serving	  
as	  complementary	  resources	  and	  focal	  points	  for	  assistance.	  This	  state-­‐centered	  approach	  
and	  respect	  for	  national	  self-­‐determination	  has	  thus	  inadvertently	  entitled	  power	  to	  states,	  
allowing	  them	  to	  act	  on	  their	  own	  behalf	  driven	  by	  the	  determination	  of	  geopolitical	  and	  
economic	  interests.	  States	  and	  local	  communities	  become	  more	  vulnerable	  due	  to	  
uncoordinated	  and	  inconsistent	  pledge	  of	  help.	  
Finally,	  within	  realism	  and	  neorealism,	  global	  epidemic	  control	  has	  been	  discussed	  under	  
the	  framework	  of	  global	  health	  security	  along	  with	  bioterrorism	  and	  other	  human	  hazards.	  
(Fidler,	  1996;	  Fidler,	  2006;	  Fidler,	  2007)	  Even	  though	  by	  conceptualizing	  health	  as	  a	  security	  
issue	  has	  raised	  awareness	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  health	  among	  politicians,	  it	  has	  hindered	  
to	  further	  develop	  a	  functional	  global	  governance	  system.	  Security	  has	  been	  an	  idea	  framed	  
to	  “justify	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  action”	  as	  a	  primary	  objective	  to	  protect	  national	  
interests	  and	  predominance.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  Employing	  such	  a	  security	  framework,	  not	  
only	  forces	  us	  into	  the	  rationale	  actor	  model	  dilemma	  discussed	  above	  since	  security	  is	  the	  
primary	  interest	  of	  sovereign	  states,	  but	  also	  exposes	  us	  to	  higher	  risks	  of	  an	  
over-­‐politicized	  global	  health	  arena.	  Security	  is	  a	  controversial	  term	  which	  has	  been	  used	  
differently	  by	  different	  groups	  under	  varied	  circumstances.	  It	  is	  always	  uncertain	  in	  
answering	  “whose	  security	  from	  whom”.	  The	  military	  connotations	  of	  the	  word	  “security”	  
can	  easily	  exacerbate	  tensions	  among	  nations	  and	  group	  of	  politicians,	  which	  may	  lead	  to	  
risks	  of	  countries	  becoming	  protectionists.	  (Irwin,	  2010)	  The	  over	  securitization	  of	  highly	  
pathogenic	  H5N1	  contributed	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  disputes	  between	  developing	  and	  developed	  
countries	  about	  international	  virus	  sharing,	  which	  has	  largely	  complicated	  the	  already	  
difficult	  international	  health	  cooperation.	  (Elbe,	  2010)	  The	  increased	  linkage	  between	  
terrorism	  and	  infectious	  disease	  agents	  has	  also	  raised	  complaints	  about	  additional	  barriers	  
on	  trade	  and	  migration,	  causing	  unnecessary	  disputes	  and	  fear.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  by	  
moving	  health	  issues	  out	  of	  a	  pure	  technical	  arena,	  it	  could	  prevent	  us	  from	  understanding	  
the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  health,	  poverty,	  social	  behaviors	  and	  general	  political	  
economic	  conditions.	  (Irwin,	  2010)	  
The	  liberal	  and	  neoliberal	  perspectives	  differ	  from	  realist	  and	  neorealist	  schools	  of	  thoughts	  
in	  taking	  interdependence	  of	  various	  actors	  and	  convergence	  of	  interests	  into	  consideration.	  
Moving	  on	  from	  a	  centered-­‐focus	  on	  self-­‐interests,	  liberal	  and	  neoliberal	  thoughts	  
incorporates	  pursuit	  of	  goals	  covering	  interests	  transcending	  beyond	  state	  borders,	  which	  
creates	  potential	  structure	  for	  states	  to	  undertake	  substantial	  endeavors	  of	  cooperation	  at	  
the	  goal	  of	  maximizing	  absolute	  gains.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  Although	  liberalism	  and	  
neoliberalism	  takes	  a	  significant	  step	  further	  in	  engaging	  states	  in	  transnational	  
cooperation,	  it	  fails	  to	  clarify	  rules	  of	  conduct	  for	  cooperation	  and	  suffers	  in	  concrete	  
measures	  to	  ensure	  adherence	  and	  hold	  actors	  accountable.	  
First	  of	  all,	  liberalism	  and	  neoliberalism	  still	  rely	  on	  the	  premise	  of	  the	  “rationale	  actor	  
model”.	  Voluntary	  compliance	  is	  not	  based	  on	  legitimate	  and	  genuine	  ethical	  consensus	  
thus	  certain	  actors	  may	  stop	  to	  cooperate	  if	  mutual	  agreements	  can	  not	  continue	  to	  
provide	  them	  with	  benefits	  of	  their	  own	  preferences.	  (Yach,	  1998b)	  It	  therefore	  results	  in	  a	  
similar	  crisis	  as	  in	  the	  realist	  and	  neorealism	  framework	  that	  actors	  can	  be	  unreliable	  and	  
unaccountable	  after	  doing	  its	  own	  absolute	  gain	  calculation.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  
Apparently	  when	  global	  epidemics	  hit,	  irresponsibility	  and	  unaccountable	  reactions	  
produce	  rapid	  spread	  of	  disease	  and	  risk	  of	  death.	  It	  leaves	  much	  more	  to	  desire	  of	  a	  
theoretical	  framework	  in	  which	  global	  epidemics	  control	  is	  sensible	  target	  and	  compliances	  
proceed	  based	  on	  ethical	  and	  moral	  commitments.	  
Second,	  a	  liberal	  or	  neoliberal	  approach	  tends	  to	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  contractual	  
mechanism,	  which	  confines	  them	  in	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  comprehensive	  consent.	  This	  would	  
create	  difficulties	  in	  global	  epidemics	  control	  as	  containing	  transmission	  requires	  more	  than	  
principles	  and	  treaties	  and	  success	  relies	  on	  nothing	  but	  quick	  action	  and	  implementation,	  
based	  on	  ethical	  and	  empirical	  investigations.	  When	  crisis	  does	  hit,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  
important	  to	  know	  what	  exactly	  one	  should	  respond	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  rather	  than	  wait	  and	  
remind	  each	  other	  what	  general	  principles	  they	  have	  agreed	  on	  and	  endorsed	  on	  papers.	  
The	  liberal	  and	  neoliberal	  framework	  thus	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  to	  delineate	  
responsibilities	  among	  actors	  and	  outline	  explicit	  rules	  of	  conduct,	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  
into	  decisive	  actions.	  
Shared	  Health	  Governance	  Scheme	  
Shared	  health	  governance	  scheme	  is	  based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  moral	  values	  among	  different	  
actors	  in	  the	  global	  health	  arena	  and	  a	  social	  contract	  for	  collective	  decision	  making	  
processes.	  (Ruger,	  2011)	  It	  emphasizes	  the	  importance	  of	  establishing	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  public	  
moral	  norms	  and	  believes	  that	  the	  internalization	  of	  these	  shared	  values	  will	  encourage	  
members	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  moral	  commitments	  based	  on	  either	  voluntary	  actions	  or	  
functional	  requirements.	  The	  scheme	  has	  three	  principal	  components:	  shared	  values	  and	  
beliefs,	  responsibility	  allocation	  after	  internalizing	  the	  shared	  norms,	  a	  “global	  health	  
constitution”	  reinforcing	  the	  allocated	  responsibilities.	  
Shared	  values	  or	  ideas	  play	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  laying	  the	  foundation	  for	  coordinating	  parties	  
across	  sectors	  to	  solve	  common	  problems.	  It	  forms	  the	  basis	  and	  serves	  as	  “focal	  points”	  in	  
defining	  collaborative	  solutions.	  (Ruger,	  2011)	  These	  shared	  social	  norms	  should	  not	  only	  
comply	  with	  universal	  ethical	  standards	  based	  on	  the	  goal	  of	  human	  flourishing,	  but	  also	  
incorporate	  self-­‐	  and	  personal	  interests,	  indicating	  a	  process	  of	  either	  sublimation	  of	  
internal	  beliefs	  or	  internalization	  of	  external	  moral	  obligations.	  It	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  bringing	  
joint	  actions	  to	  solve	  global	  health	  problems	  under	  a	  normative	  framework.	  The	  
internalized	  ethical	  norms	  build	  strong	  moral	  influences	  on	  national	  and	  international	  
policy	  and	  serve	  as	  overarching	  guiding	  principles	  to	  establish	  collaborative	  solutions	  and	  
ensure	  consistent	  adherence.	   	  
With	  a	  set	  of	  mutually	  agreed	  public	  moral	  norms,	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  
delineated	  and	  allocated	  to	  different	  actors	  according	  to	  either	  functional	  or	  political	  
concerns.	  It	  thus	  establishes	  a	  mix-­‐level	  governance	  structure,	  in	  which	  national	  and	  global	  
actors	  are	  glued	  by	  the	  shared	  moral	  commitments	  and	  are	  responsible	  to	  hold	  themselves	  
accountable	  by	  taking	  on	  respective	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  (Buchanan	  &	  DeCamp,	  2006)	  
The	  global	  health	  constitution	  is	  an	  alternative	  governance	  structure	  to	  a	  world	  health	  
government	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  prescribe	  respective	  obligations	  and	  direct	  actors’	  
behaviors	  by	  contextualizing	  and	  authorizing	  the	  overall	  framework.	  (Ruger,	  2011)	  By	  
officially	  contextualizing	  the	  shared	  moral	  norms	  and	  allocated	  responsibilities,	  actors	  in	  
the	  national	  level	  as	  well	  as	  the	  international	  level	  are	  supposed	  to	  hold	  the	  system	  
together	  and	  make	  collective	  decisions	  to	  finally	  address	  shared	  and	  transnational	  problem.	   	  
The	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme	  is	  beneficial	  in	  various	  ways	  of	  providing	  governance	  
implications	  on	  global	  epidemics	  and	  developing	  more	  coherent	  and	  practical	  political	  
theories	  for	  international	  and	  national	  actors	  to	  fulfill	  their	  roles	  in	  global	  infectious	  disease	  
epidemics	  control.	  
First	  of	  all,	  the	  underpinning	  unit	  within	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme,	  the	  shared	  
public	  moral	  norms	  are	  essential	  to	  indemnify	  and	  rectify	  the	  externality	  of	  epidemics.	  
Infectious	  agents	  are	  known	  for	  their	  outrageous	  ability	  to	  communicate	  in	  the	  population	  
and	  among	  hosts	  without	  being	  noticed.	  Compared	  with	  most	  chronic	  illnesses,	  infectious	  
diseases	  are	  featured	  with	  enormous	  epidemiological	  externalities:	  individuals’	  state	  of	  
infection	  and	  behavioral	  reactions	  can	  cause	  far-­‐reaching	  influences	  on	  disease	  
transmission	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  control	  measures.	  A	  single	  “superspreader”	  can	  lead	  to	  
uncontainable	  disasters.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SARS,	  249	  cases	  around	  the	  world	  had	  been	  
traced	  to	  one	  sick	  man	  from	  Guangdong,	  China	  who	  checked	  in	  for	  just	  one	  night	  at	  Hotel	  
Metropole	  in	  Hong	  Kong.	  Among	  the	  12	  guests	  directly	  infected	  by	  the	  sick	  man,	  many	  later	  
became	  initial	  cases	  and	  spreaders	  in	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  Canada,	  Singapore	  and	  
Vietnam.	   4	   Bearing	  in	  mind	  such	  great	  external	  impacts,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  present	  at	  the	  
center	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  obligations	  of	  not	  causing	  harm	  to	  others.	   	   Without	  shared	  moral	  
standards	  of	  protecting	  others	  by	  regulating	  individual	  behaviors,	  it	  is	  hardly	  possible	  to	  
suppress	  disease	  transmissions	  even	  with	  sound	  public	  policies.	  The	  shared	  health	  
governance	  is	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  commonly	  agreed	  social	  norms,	  including	  obligations	  
not	  to	  cause	  harm	  to	  others.	  These	  well-­‐accepted	  values	  will	  not	  only	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  
adverse	  impacts	  caused	  by	  misbehaviors	  but	  also	  are	  likely	  transformational	  factors	  to	  
compensate	  and	  rectify	  positive	  externalities.	  Ethical	  commitments	  to	  hold	  one	  
accountable	  will	  produce	  positive	  external	  impacts	  on	  protecting	  the	  health	  and	  benefits	  of	  
the	  overall	  population.	   	   	   	  
Secondly,	  shared	  health	  governance	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  internalized	  shared	  
values	  and	  an	  overlapping	  consensus	  become	  primary	  sources	  of	  inspiration	  to	  achieve	  our	  
goals.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  This	  is	  notable	  in	  particular	  for	  global	  epidemic	  control,	  as	  it	  
would	  ensure	  consistent	  investments	  and	  longstanding	  endeavors	  committed	  to	  disease	  
surveillance	  and	  emergency	  preparedness.	  Epidemics	  have	  always	  announced	  themselves	  
with	  unexpected	  explosion	  of	  cases.	  When	  everything	  goes	  well,	  public	  health	  emergency	  
preparedness	  and	  surveillance	  systems	  are	  usually	  present	  unnoticed,	  but	  when	  crisis	  does	  
hit	  and	  responses	  are	  needed,	  people	  begin	  to	  recognize	  their	  existence	  and	  the	  enormous	  
role	  a	  solid	  emergency	  preparedness	  plan	  can	  play	  for	  ultimate	  success.	  It	  is	  for	  sure	  that	  
we	  need	  surveillance	  and	  preparedness	  to	  ensure	  quick	  and	  decisive	  responses,	  but	  it	  
matters	  more	  how	  much	  effort	  actors	  can	  and	  are	  willing	  to	  give.	  Uncertainties	  of	  
outbreaks	  signify	  the	  fact	  that	  necessities	  of	  emergency	  preparedness	  and	  surveillance	  
systems	  can	  be	  largely	  overlooked	  and	  attention	  can	  be	  easily	  moved	  away	  when	  
protecting	  self-­‐interests	  on	  other	  issues	  become	  more	  desperate	  for	  any	  economic	  or	  
political	  reasons.	  It	  is	  more	  than	  often	  that	  resources	  are	  mobilized	  to	  other	  priorities	  such	  
as	  trade,	  economic	  growth,	  defense	  and	  security	  as	  these	  are	  always	  key	  factors	  for	  
governments	  to	  uphold	  order	  and	  keep	  in	  force.	  As	  a	  result,	  without	  accepted	  and	  
internalized	  moral	  obligations,	  longstanding	  and	  consistent	  shared	  commitments	  to	  invest	  
on	  epidemics	  control	  are	  difficult	  even	  though	  they	  are	  the	  prerequisite	  for	  sustainable	  and	  
successful	  infectious	  disease	  control.	  A	  key	  component	  in	  the	  shared	  health	  governance	  
structure	  is	  the	  creation	  and	  internalization	  of	  shared	  ethical	  principles	  which	  will	  ensure	  
coherent	  governance	  structure	  and	  consistent	  ethical	  commitments	  on	  communicable	  
disease	  control	  from	  national	  and	  global	  actors	  even	  when	  they	  are	  confronted	  with	  
interest	  conflicts.	   	  
Thirdly,	  shared	  health	  governance	  ensures	  authentic	  cooperation	  by	  asking	  different	  actors	  
and	  groups	  to	  embrace	  and	  successfully	  fulfill	  their	  respective	  duties	  based	  on	  functional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   “From	  one	  hotel	  guest,	  many	  infectious”,	  New	  York	  Times,	  2003.	  
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2003/04/01/science/20030401_DOCS_GRAPHIC.html	  
requirements	  and	  voluntary	  commitments.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress).	  Cooperation	  and	  
well-­‐coordinated	  efforts	  play	  crucial	  roles	  in	  containing	  infectious	  disease	  transmission.	  On	  
one	  hand,	  control	  of	  infectious	  disease	  epidemics	  is	  a	  monumental	  challenge	  in	  respect	  
with	  the	  magnificent	  large	  amount	  of	  resources	  needed	  for	  a	  success.	  Just	  to	  consider	  the	  
broad	  range	  of	  expertise	  required	  to	  address	  an	  infectious	  disease	  outbreak:	  it	  is	  a	  total	  
team	  effort	  by	  microbiologists,	  lab	  researchers,	  epidemiologists,	  field	  investigators,	  nurses,	  
physicians,	  social	  workers,	  public	  communication	  specialists,	  government	  officials,	  
diplomats	  and	  sometimes	  even	  police	  officers.	  It	  not	  only	  indicates	  a	  fact	  that	  no	  single	  
player	  can	  accomplish	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  but	  also	  raises	  concerns	  that	  cooperation	  can	  be	  
dysfunctional	  and	  fragmented	  because	  of	  overlapped	  and	  redundant	  functions	  among	  
actors.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  accountability	  of	  actors	  is	  a	  primary	  concern	  in	  epidemics	  
control	  due	  to	  short	  board	  effect.	  Failure	  of	  any	  single	  actor	  in	  fulfilling	  its	  mission	  will	  
deliver	  a	  dangerous	  loss.	  It	  is	  therefore	  of	  exceptional	  significance	  that	  each	  player	  is	  fully	  
aware	  of	  what	  they	  ought	  to	  do	  and	  holds	  itself	  accountable	  by	  carrying	  out	  respective	  
duties	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  way.	  Despite	  of	  the	  complexities	  in	  global	  epidemics	  control,	  the	  
shared	  health	  governance	  scheme	  is	  able	  to	  address	  both	  challenges.	  First,	  in	  shared	  health	  
governance,	  an	  explicit	  system	  is	  crafted	  around	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  values	  and	  different	  actors	  
establish	  a	  mixed-­‐level	  of	  governance	  structure,	  in	  which	  responsibilities	  are	  allocated	  
through	  an	  evidence	  based	  approach	  according	  to	  overarching	  objectives	  and	  consensus.	  In	  
light	  of	  a	  collective	  desire	  to	  contain	  global	  epidemics,	  control	  measures	  can	  be	  broken	  
down	  through	  analysis	  of	  principal	  components:	  prepare,	  investigate,	  respond	  and	  
evaluate.	  It	  places	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  governance	  and	  coordination	  
structure	  with	  clear	  lines	  of	  responsibilities	  and	  accountabilities.	  By	  allocating	  duties	  and	  
obligations	  based	  on	  a	  balanced	  view	  of	  components	  to	  achieve	  mutual	  benefits,	  it	  
contributes	  to	  avoid	  conflicts,	  waste	  and	  reduce	  duplication	  and	  inefficiency.	  (Ruger,	  2011)	  
Second,	  internalized	  ethical	  commitments	  will	  connect	  and	  align	  different	  actors	  with	  more	  
power	  for	  compliance	  and	  less	  chance	  of	  duty	  discharge,	  which	  help	  us	  avoid	  the	  short	  
board	  effect.	  Actors	  are	  accountable	  and	  voluntarily	  prepared	  to	  reach	  for	  compliances	  
because	  of	  internalized	  ethical	  obligations.	  They	  are	  also	  capable	  and	  feel	  better	  chance	  of	  
carrying	  out	  tasks	  allocated	  based	  on	  their	  technical	  and	  functional	  capabilities.	  Actors	  are	  
then	  complementary	  in	  roles	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  system.	  It	  is	  sufficient	  to	  avoid	  short	  
board	  effect.	   	  
Who	  is	  in	  Charge	  of	  What	  in	  Global	  Epidemics	  Control?	  Responsibilities	  of	  Nation	  
States	  and	  WHO	  
Whenever	  and	  wherever	  an	  outbreak	  or	  epidemic	  occurs,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  detect	  it	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible	  and	  to	  control	  the	  spread	  of	  diseases	  so	  that	  we	  can	  ultimately	  save	  lives	  among	  
the	  population	  at	  risk.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  health,	  especially	  in	  global	  outbreaks	  and	  epidemic	  
control,	  actors	  that	  have	  been	  actively	  involved	  are	  national	  governments,	  international	  
organizations	  and	  other	  units	  such	  as	  non-­‐profit	  organizations.	  (Stern,	  2004)	  Because	  there	  
is	  no	  real	  world	  government	  with	  both	  authority	  and	  capacity	  to	  implement	  powers,	  what	  
requires	  is	  a	  functional,	  effective	  and	  comprehensive	  health	  system	  consisted	  of	  various	  
actors	  based	  upon	  mutual	  agreements	  to	  take	  joint	  actions	  and	  distinct	  functions.	  An	  
explicit	  and	  coherent	  governance	  structure	  in	  which	  duties	  of	  state	  agencies	  and	  
international	  actors	  are	  clearly	  delineated	  is	  necessary	  to	  reduce	  duplicated	  efforts,	  
inefficiency	  and	  conflicts.	   	  
Under	  the	  realm	  of	  shared	  health	  governance,	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  allocated	  
based	  on	  functions	  that	  are	  both	  ethical	  and	  technical.	  (Ruger,	  2009,	  2011,	  in	  progress)	  
Despite	  the	  presence	  of	  shared	  purpose	  and	  principles,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  differences	  in	  their	  
structure,	  power	  balancing	  mechanism	  and	  decision	  making	  process,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  
assume	  that	  national	  governments	  and	  international	  agencies	  have	  varied	  strengths	  in	  
carrying	  out	  specific	  strategies	  to	  control	  global	  epidemics.	  (Table	  1)	  
Table	  1	  Delineated	  Responsibilities	  National	  and	  International	  Actors	  in	  Global	  Epidemics	  
Control	  
State	  Actors	   WHO	  and	  Global	  Agencies	  
• Build	  and	  finance	  a	  functional	  
healthcare	  system,	  especially	  a	  
disease	  surveillance	  and	  reporting	  
system,	  developing	  plans	  to	  
prepare	  for	  public	  health	  
emergencies	  
• Aggregate	  resources	  to	  investigate	  
and	  respond	  when	  epidemics	  occur	  
• Provide	  support	  to	  institutions	  on	  
research	  and	  development	  about	  
diseases	   	  
• Issue	  policies	  and	  laws	  to	  empower	  
local	  health	  departments	  and	  
manage	  its	  citizens	  on	  enforcement	  
of	  preventative	  measures	  such	  as	  
quarantine,	  vaccination	  and	  
isolation	  
• 	   Share	  information	  and	  resources	  
with	  the	  global	  community	  in	  
particular	  data	  and	  technology	  
• Comply	  with	  international	  
regulations	  on	  global	  infectious	  
disease	  
• Lead	  and	  promote	  the	  discourse	  of	  
shared	  values	  and	  public	  norms	  
• Providing	  technical,	  knowledge	  
assistance	  to	  help	  member	  states	  
build	  up	  their	  health	  system	  
• Coordinate	  research	  resources	  and	  
disseminate	  norms,	  standards	  and	  
recommendations	  
• In	  response	  to	  a	  global	  infectious	  
disease	  epidemic	  provide	  technical	  
or	  personnel	  support	  as	  a	  surge	  
capacity	  for	  nation	  states	   	  
• Serve	  as	  an	  information	  hub	  and	  
promote	  communication	  and	  
mitigate	  disputes	  among	  its	  
member	  states	  
• Establish	  international	  conventions	  
and	  agreements	  to	  contextualize	  
the	  agreed	  norms	  and	  
responsibilities	  
• Develop	  soft	  powers	  such	  as	  travel	  
advisory	  and	  public	  statement	  to	  
promote	  cooperation	  and	  
compliance	   	  
	  
In	  respect	  with	  infectious	  disease,	  states	  are	  the	  leading	  player	  in	  realizing	  the	  objectives	  of	  
global	  epidemics	  control.	  States	  are	  always	  the	  first	  to	  detect	  an	  outbreak	  and	  also	  the	  one	  
who	  will	  bear	  the	  heaviest	  burden	  of	  a	  deadly	  infectious	  disease	  epidemic.	  It	  is	  of	  its	  
interest,	  both	  ethically	  and	  politically	  to	  contain	  the	  disease	  and	  protect	  its	  citizens	  from	  
the	  threat	  of	  death,	  thus	  maintaining	  order	  and	  governance	  in	  the	  society.	  The	  idea	  of	  
putting	  states	  at	  the	  center	  of	  shared	  health	  governance	  of	  global	  epidemics	  is	  justified	  in	  
two	  ways.	  
From	  a	  manage-­‐down	  perspective,	  states	  and	  local	  governments	  are	  the	  one	  working	  
directly	  with	  individuals	  through	  regulation,	  oversight	  and	  enforcement	  of	  rules.	  Although	  
disease	  prevention	  and	  control	  is	  usually	  discussed	  as	  a	  population-­‐oriented	  approach,	  the	  
success	  however	  is	  based	  on	  the	  actual	  effectiveness	  of	  policy	  implementation	  and	  rests	  on	  
individual	  compliances.	  Compared	  with	  other	  chronic	  illnesses,	  individual	  behavior	  matters	  
a	  lot	  more	  in	  containing	  the	  spread	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  since	  infectious	  agents	  are	  
communicated	  through	  personal	  contacts,	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  States	  resume	  the	  power	  
to	  command	  and	  manage	  individual	  citizens	  and	  as	  a	  result	  are	  the	  best	  one	  to	  implement	  
policies	  such	  as	  quarantine	  and	  isolation.	  Moreover,	  the	  police	  power	  of	  the	  state	  provides	  
state	  actors	  with	  the	  authority	  and	  capacity	  to	  enact	  regulations	  and	  press	  for	  compliances.	  
(Ruger,	  2010)	  
In	  addition,	  whenever	  there	  is	  an	  outbreak,	  national	  governments	  and	  local	  health	  agencies	  
are	  usually	  the	  first	  to	  know	  about	  the	  disease,	  should	  they	  have	  a	  well-­‐developed	  disease	  
surveillance	  system.	  No	  one	  other	  than	  the	  local	  health	  clinics	  is	  more	  close	  to	  face	  the	  
burden	  of	  surging	  demands	  on	  healthcare	  services	  because	  of	  a	  sudden	  explosion	  of	  cases.	  
When	  an	  outbreak	  occurs,	  local	  health	  agencies	  also	  stands	  in	  the	  frontline	  in	  fighting	  
against	  the	  disease	  by	  implementing	  national	  policies.	  With	  a	  functioning	  health	  system,	  
states	  are	  the	  one	  in	  a	  better	  chance	  than	  WHO	  to	  get	  the	  most	  accurate	  and	  best	  available	  
data	  and	  conduct	  evaluation	  and	  make	  decisions.	  As	  a	  result,	  states	  should	  be	  the	  one	  to	  
initiate	  efforts	  to	  contain	  a	  disease	  outbreak,	  which	  includes	  but	  not	  limits	  to	  take	  
quarantine	  and	  isolation	  measures,	  issue	  travel	  alerts,	  investigate,	  disseminate	  information	  
and	  disease	  reports.	  Without	  managed	  and	  coordinated	  efforts	  committed	  by	  the	  state	  and	  
local	  governments,	  we	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  finally	  prevent	  the	  spread.	  
From	  a	  manage-­‐up	  perspective,	  states	  are	  the	  direct	  components	  of	  any	  global	  governance	  
regime,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  national	  representatives	  are	  the	  one	  that	  communicates	  directly	  
with	  international	  agencies.	  Implementation	  of	  any	  concerted	  international	  convention	  
requires	  participation	  from	  the	  states.	  In	  a	  global	  surveillance	  system,	  international	  
agencies	  would	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  state	  units	  to	  establish	  and	  promote	  local	  surveillance,	  
collect	  data	  and	  disseminate	  information	  appropriately.	  (Calain,	  2007)	   	  
Sovereign	  states	  have	  the	  capacity	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  regulate	  the	  behavior	  its	  own	  citizens	  
and	  actors	  in	  the	  local	  level,	  through	  public	  policy	  and	  enforcement	  capacity	  of	  law	  and	  
police	  system,	  so	  they	  are,	  for	  both	  political	  and	  functional	  reasons	  the	  best	  option	  to	  take	  
on	  main	  duties	  of	  reducing	  disease	  transmission.	  To	  defend	  the	  need	  of	  their	  own	  citizens,	  
the	  state	  governments	  must	  be	  responsible	  for	  financing	  and	  structuring	  a	  healthcare	  
system	  that	  is	  working	  in	  response	  to	  public	  health	  emergencies.	  Beyond	  sufficient	  
preparedness	  of	  healthcare	  facilities,	  state	  governments	  shall	  be	  able	  to	  take	  decisive	  
measures	  such	  as	  quarantine,	  isolation	  and	  early	  detection	  to	  interrupt	  disease	  
transmission.	  A	  state’s	  authority	  to	  regulate	  its	  own	  citizen’s	  behavior	  and	  compel	  isolation	  
and	  quarantine	  within	  its	  borders	  derives	  from	  its	  inherent	  police	  power.	  (Ruger,	  2010)	  
With	  this	  supreme	  legitimacy,	  state	  governments	  will	  not	  only	  be	  able	  to	  enforce	  
individuals	  but	  also	  local	  level	  actors	  and	  agencies	  to	  comply	  with	  standards	  and	  norms.	  
This	  is	  of	  foremost	  importance	  since	  disease	  transmission	  can	  be	  stopped	  only	  if	  there	  is	  an	  
effective	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  which	  requires	  individuals	  and	  local	  actors	  to	  moderate	  their	  
behavior	  and	  comply	  with	  implementation	  standards	  of	  any	  policies	  or	  intervention	  
measures.	  Beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  national	  interest,	  on	  the	  global	  level,	  to	  defend	  the	  
necessity	  of	  the	  overall	  world	  population,	  nation	  states	  shall	  be	  responsible	  for	  timely	  and	  
accurate	  assessment	  of	  disease	  transmission	  state	  and	  sharing	  vital	  frontline	  experience	  
and	  knowledge,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  diagnostic	  definition,	  epidemiology	  trend.	   	  
Global	  actors	  have	  different	  roles	  in	  parallel	  with	  their	  general	  functions	  and	  capacities	  
distinguishing	  from	  government	  agencies.	  Given	  the	  specificity	  of	  its	  core	  functions	  and	  the	  
legitimacy	  as	  a	  world	  leader,	  WHO	  shall	  carry	  on	  its	  international	  obligations	  as	  well	  as	  
extra-­‐national	  requirements,	  which	  would	  remedy	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  states.	  Their	  
commitments	  comprise	  categories	  like	  developing	  norms	  and	  standards,	  directing	  and	  
coordination,	  providing	  assistance.	  Global	  actors	  shall	  serve	  as	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  
coordination,	  resource	  mobilization,	  technical	  assistance	  services,	  information	  and	  
knowledge	  dissemination	  and	  guidelines	  development.	  (Kamradt-­‐Scott,	  2011)	  
Beyond	  state	  obligations,	  duties	  of	  global	  actors	  are	  defined	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  an	  
overarching	  governance	  structure	  to	  bind	  to	  specific	  needs	  in	  global	  health	  that	  have	  not	  
been	  or	  cannot	  be	  fulfilled	  by	  states.	  (Ruger,	  in	  progress)	  Global	  health	  institutions	  can	  
serve	  as	  chief	  complementary	  resources	  to	  rectify	  any	  failures	  or	  inadequacies	  of	  state	  
actors.	  Although	  without	  a	  true	  global	  health	  government,	  WHO	  and	  international	  agencies	  
are	  limited	  in	  their	  role	  of	  enforcement.	  Compared	  to	  the	  hard	  coercive	  powers	  owned	  by	  
national	  states,	  global	  health	  institutions	  have	  to	  employ	  soft	  powers	  such	  as	  peer	  pressure	  
or	  patient	  diplomacy	  to	  ensure	  compliances.	  However,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  international	  
organizations	  have	  entitled	  them	  unique	  authorities	  that	  national	  states	  do	  not	  have,	  of	  
carrying	  out	  specific	  tasks	  tied	  to	  specific	  needs	  of	  global	  health.	   	  
First	  and	  foremost,	  global	  health	  institutions	  generally	  have	  broader	  and	  comprehensive	  
range	  of	  expertise	  and	  bigger	  potentials	  to	  mobilize	  resources	  to	  address	  cross	  border	  and	  
sector	  problems.	  Connected	  with	  many	  skilled	  specialists	  in	  elite	  research	  and	  education	  
centers	  around	  the	  world,	  WHO	  is	  functionally	  able	  to	  provide	  assistance	  to	  those	  who	  falls	  
short	  of	  particular	  expertise	  required	  to	  address	  the	  problem.	  Moreover,	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  
expertise	  also	  designate	  WHO	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  issue	  international	  standards,	  such	  as	  case	  
definition,	  standardized	  treatment	  plan,	  protective	  measurements	  which	  are	  all	  critical	  
evidence-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  control	  disease	  transmission.	  
Secondly,	  when	  nation	  states	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  their	  responsibility	  in	  initiating	  efforts	  to	  make	  
diseases	  under	  control,	  WHO	  is	  the	  most	  legitimate	  and	  capable	  player	  to	  step	  in	  from	  both	  
political	  and	  functional	  perspectives.	  (Chan,	  2010)	  When	  states	  are	  functionally	  incapable	  
of	  controlling	  the	  disease	  due	  to	  various	  reasons	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  resources	  or	  personnel	  
support,	  WHO	  is	  the	  one	  they	  could	  turn	  for	  help,	  asking	  for	  technical	  or	  material	  support.	  
If	  the	  states	  fail	  intentionally	  and	  deny	  the	  outbreak	  because	  of	  self-­‐interests,	  WHO	  shall	  
pressure	  for	  action	  through	  travel	  advisory	  and	  patient	  diplomacy.	  These	  two	  measures	  
serve	  as	  soft	  powers	  of	  WHO	  to	  coerce	  nation	  states’	  compliances.	  
Moreover,	  WHO	  can	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  as	  a	  moderator	  or	  arbiter	  in	  disputes	  given	  its	  
highest	  legitimacy	  in	  global	  health	  governance.	  (Chan,	  2010)	  When	  states	  are	  questioned	  in	  
their	  overreactions	  such	  as	  issuing	  travel	  alerts	  to	  areas	  suffering	  disease	  outbreaks,	  WHO	  
should	  take	  the	  responsibility	  to	  facilitate	  communication	  and	  public	  information	  flow	  
between	  different	  actors.	  It	  should	  also	  assemble	  a	  consultant	  group	  with	  experts	  from	  
different	  fields	  as	  independent	  or	  third	  party	  evaluation	  resources.	  Without	  its	  efforts,	  
information	  or	  message	  can	  be	  misinterpreted,	  which	  will	  hinder	  agreements	  settlement	  
and	  further	  joint	  actions	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  WHO	  is	  currently	  the	  only	  international	  
organization	  that	  is	  both	  functionally	  and	  legitimately	  able	  to	  take	  actions.	  
Generally	  speaking,	  comprehensive	  preparedness,	  fast	  and	  decisive	  responses	  are	  always	  
central	  to	  prevent	  and	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  those	  infectious	  agents.	  To	  mitigate	  the	  risk	  of	  
infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  and	  conduct	  effective	  control	  measures	  in	  each	  public	  health	  
emergency	  situation,	  we	  shall	  seek	  specific	  approaches	  that	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  limit	  the	  spread	  
of	  diseases.	  Relevant	  agencies	  and	  actors	  for	  health	  are	  responsible	  for	  planning	  and	  
response	  to	  the	  sharp	  increase	  of	  cases	  of	  a	  certain	  disease.	  For	  any	  legitimate	  national	  
governments,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  their	  priorities	  and	  leading	  responsibilities	  to	  keep	  their	  citizens	  
from	  the	  threat	  of	  diseases.	  As	  a	  central	  focal	  point	  of	  global	  health	  governance,	  the	  World	  
Health	  Organization	  has	  been	  the	  most	  prominent	  actor	  of	  international	  health	  activities	  
particularly	  in	  global	  pandemics	  control.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  actors,	  non-­‐profit	  
organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Red	  Cross	  have	  started	  to	  take	  an	  integrated	  approach	  towards	  
disaster	  relief	  and	  postdisaster	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  control.	  However,	  previous	  
cases	  have	  shown	  that	  currently	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  is	  quite	  limited	  
especially	  during	  pandemic	  emergencies	  and	  the	  services	  they	  are	  providing	  are	  not	  
consistent	  and	  solidly	  identified.	  (Zacher,	  chp3,	  p52)	  Given	  these	  restrictions,	  non-­‐profit	  
organizations	  will	  not	  be	  included	  in	  the	  following	  analysis	  and	  we	  will	  confine	  the	  research	  
on	  the	  role	  national	  governments	  and	  international	  organizations	  play	  when	  global	  
outbreaks	  or	  pandemics	  occur.	  
LESSONS	  FROM	  THE	  SARS	  EPDEMIC	  IN	  2003	  
Severe	  Acute	  Respiratory	  Syndrome	  (SARS)	  is	  considered	  as	  the	  first	  major	  novel	  infectious	  
disease	  to	  hit	  the	  international	  community	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  (Heymann,	  2006)	  Its	  special	  
place	  in	  human	  history	  and	  development	  of	  the	  disease	  has	  made	  it	  a	  prime	  model	  to	  
examine	  the	  role	  of	  national	  actors	  and	  international	  agencies	  in	  global	  infectious	  disease	  
epidemics	  control	  under	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme.	   	  
Originated	  from	  Southeast	  China,	  it	  spread	  to	  37	  countries	  and	  claimed	  8,422	  cases	  and	  916	  
deaths	  worldwide	  within	  months.	  The	  origin	  of	  SARS	  is	  retrospectively	  linked	  with	  the	  first	  
case	  of	  atypical	  pneumonia	  in	  Southeast	  China	  in	  mid-­‐Nov	  2002.	  The	  highly	  contagious	  
disease	  then	  spread	  along	  with	  international	  travels,	  posing	  serious	  threats	  to	  people	  all	  
around	  the	  world.	  (Figure	  1)	  
	  Figure	  1	   	   SARS	  Epidemic:	  Cases	  and	  Deaths5	  
China	  is	  not	  only	  the	  country	  where	  the	  first	  case	  of	  SARS	  was	  identified	  but	  also	  the	  one	  
hit	  the	  hardest	  by	  the	  devastating	  disease,	  accounting	  for	  half	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  cases	  
and	  deaths.	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO),	  as	  the	  principal	  international	  organization	  
leading	  to	  ensure	  the	  health	  and	  wellbeings	  of	  people	  all	  around	  the	  world,	  has	  taken	  an	  
active	  role	  and	  stand	  in	  the	  forefront	  in	  coordinating	  the	  fight	  against	  SARS	  since	  the	  start	  
of	  the	  epidemic.	   	  
Shared	  Health	  Governance	  in	  SARS	   	  
China	  and	  SARS	  
In	  China,	  public	  health	  is	  inherently	  a	  government	  responsibility	  and	  employs	  what	  Turnock	  
calls	  a	  “command	  and	  control”	  approach,	  where	  government	  focuses	  on	  using	  its	  own	  
resources	  to	  improve	  health.	  (Schwartz,	  2010)	  Back	  to	  the	  1950s	  when	  China	  was	  founded,	  
containing	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  were	  one	  of	  the	  top	  priorities	  of	  the	  government.	  
During	  the	  1950s,	  many	  severe	  epidemics	  became	  well	  controlled,	  including	  malaria,	  
smallpox,	  measles.	  Surveillance	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  is	  the	  main	  public	  health	  concern	  in	  
China.	  (Freeman	  &	  Lu,	  2009)There	  have	  been	  requirements	  of	  routine	  reporting	  of	  selected	  
infectious	  disease	  since	  1950	  through	  the	  county-­‐level	  public	  health	  institutions.	  (Kaufman,	  
2009)	  The	  National	  Disease	  Reporting	  System	  was	  first	  initiated	  in	  1959	  as	  a	  system	  for	  
reporting	  communicable	  diseases.	  In	  1987,	  a	  Nationwide	  Anti-­‐epidemic	  Computer	  
Telecommunication	  Network	  was	  established	  as	  an	  official	  information	  system	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Sars_Cases_and_Deaths.pdf&page=1	  
national	  Disease	  Reporting	  System.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  regional	  centers	  
of	  health	  and	  epidemic	  prevention	  support	  this	  network	  and	  utilize	  it	  to	  monitor	  disease	  
epidemics	  at	  various	  levels	  within	  the	  public	  health	  system.6	   Data	  collected	  through	  the	  
disease	  surveillance	  network	  serves	  as	  the	  basis	  to	  formulate	  health	  policies	  and	  devise	  
strategies	  for	  preventing	  disease.	  A	  computerized	  reporting	  system	  for	  notifiable	  diseases	  
has	  been	  established	  that	  links	  China's	  30	  provinces,	  autonomous	  regions,	  and	  
municipalities.	  Mechanisms	  for	  providing	  timely	  feedback	  to	  units	  that	  report	  data	  and	  for	  
systematically	  assessing	  the	  quality	  of	  those	  data	  are	  fundamental	  attributes	  of	  this	  
system.7	  
The	  initial	  case	  of	  SARS	  appeared	  in	  Guangdong,	  China	  as	  early	  as	  November	  2002.	  The	  
provincial	  CDC	  noticed	  that	  there	  were	  a	  cluster	  of	  cases	  with	  similar	  flu-­‐like	  syndromes	  
and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  was	  then	  notified.	  As	  things	  progressed,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  
convened	  a	  committee	  to	  investigate	  the	  outbreak	  and	  informed	  the	  WHO	  that	  the	  disease	  
was	  under	  control.	  However,	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  strategy	  to	  cover-­‐up	  as	  the	  
superspreader,	  a	  65-­‐year-­‐old	  medical	  doctor	  from	  Guangdong	  checked	  into	  the	  9th	  floor	  of	  
the	  Metropole	  hotel	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  triggered	  a	  global	  transmission	  chain	  of	  the	  disease	  
through	  people	  who	  had	  contact	  with	  him	  in	  the	  hotel.	   	  
Chinese	  government	  did	  not	  fully	  involved	  in	  addressing	  the	  spread	  of	  this	  dreadful	  disease	  
until	  late	  March	  2003,	  which	  was	  4	  months	  after	  the	  emergency	  of	  the	  first	  case.	  (Yoon,	  
2008)	  The	  turning	  point	  for	  full	  cooperation	  is	  the	  lessened	  political	  tension.	  With	  the	  
highest	  level	  of	  political	  support	  from	  the	  President	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  China	  
was	  able	  to	  move	  quickly	  and	  pace	  up	  from	  then.	  On	  April	  6,	  a	  Beijing	  Joint	  SARS	  Group	  
comprising	  of	  10	  task	  forces	  was	  established	  to	  oversee	  the	  outbreak	  in	  Beijing.	  (Ahmad,	  
2009)	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  confirmed	  and	  added	  SARS	  to	  the	  country's	  profile	  of	  infectious	  
diseases	  on	  April	  8.	  The	  local	  health	  departments	  were	  mandated	  by	  law	  to	  administer	  
routine	  data	  collecting	  and	  reporting,	  quarantine	  and	  isolation.	  (Ahmad,	  2009)	  In	  response	  
to	  SARS,	  the	  central	  government	  via	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  also	  swiftly	  updated	  and	  
developed	  new	  policies	  and	  regulations	  relating	  to	  infectious	  disease	  response.	  Before	  
SARS	  China	  was	  still	  using	  its	  Law	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Treatment	  of	  Infectious	  Disease	  
enacted	  in	  1989,	  with	  only	  18	  diseases	  classified	  as	  notifiable	  diseases	  including	  plague,	  
cholera	  etc.	  (Kaufman,	  2009)	  During	  the	  SARS	  epidemic,	  the	  Law	  was	  revised	  within	  20	  days	  
in	  response	  to	  the	  outbreak.	  The	  revised	  law	  and	  regulations	  were	  then	  sent	  to	  each	  
province	  across	  the	  country.	  (Schwartz,	  2010)	  A	  hospital,	  Xiaotangshan	  Hospital,	  as	  
designated	  area	  to	  admit	  SARS	  patients	  only	  were	  constructed	  and	  was	  in	  essence	  
completed	  in	  seven	  days,	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  4000	  construction	  worker	  working	  day	  and	  
night.	  It	  is	  estimated	  that	  at	  peak	  times	  there	  were	  7000	  workers	  working	  simultaneously	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	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  surveillance	  in	  China	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  Wikipedia,	  the	  free	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  (n.d.).	  Retrieved	  from	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7	   Disease	  surveillance	  in	  China	  -­‐	  Wikipedia,	  the	  free	  encyclopedia.	  (n.d.).	  Retrieved	  from	  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disease_surveillance_in_China	  
on	  the	  magnificent	  project	  and	  500	  machines	  were	  engaged	  continuously	  in	  the	  
construction.8	  
WHO	  AND	  SARS	  
Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  in	  1945,	  the	  role	  of	  reporting	  on	  
infectious	  diseases	  was	  assumed	  by	  the	  organization	  through	  the	  Weekly	  Epidemiological	  
Record.	  WHO	  launched	  its	  Epidemiological	  Surveillance	  Unit	  in	  the	  Division	  of	  
Communicable	  Diseases	  in	  1965	  and	  the	  first	  Communicable	  Disease	  Surveillance	  Reports	  
were	  published	  by	  WHO	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  Ever	  since	  then,	  the	  dissemination	  of	  global	  
surveillance	  data	  usually	  has	  been	  carried	  by	  “weekly	  reports”	  of	  disease	  of	  critical	  health	  
or	  strategic	  importance.	  (WHO,	  2006)	  
As	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  grave	  Ebola	  hemorrhagic	  fever	  outbreak	  in	  1995,	  the	  World	  Health	  
Assembly	  adopted	  its	  first	  resolution	  on	  emerging	  and	  reemerging	  infectious	  disease.	  It	  
urged	  member	  states	  to	  strengthen	  surveillance	  for	  infectious	  diseases	  in	  order	  to	  promptly	  
detect	  reemerging	  diseases	  and	  identify	  new	  infectious	  diseases.	  This	  resolution	  led	  to	  
WHO’s	  establishment	  of	  the	  Division	  of	  Emerging	  and	  other	  Communicable	  Disease	  
Surveillance	  and	  Control	  (EMC).	  It	  was	  then	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  was	  a	  urgent	  
need	  to	  draw	  up	  plans	  and	  strategies	  for	  improving	  world	  capacity	  to	  identify	  and	  respond	  
to	  new	  diseases.	  Since	  1996,	  WHO	  had	  been	  developing	  and	  testing	  a	  system,	  supported	  by	  
a	  range	  of	  new	  mechanisms,	  to	  strengthen	  global	  capacity	  to	  detect	  and	  contain	  outbreaks.	  
The	  Global	  Public	  Health	  Intelligence	  Network	  (GPHIN)	  developed	  and	  maintained	  by	  
Health	  Canada,	  taking	  advantage	  of	  advanced	  Internet	  technologies,	  continuously	  scans	  the	  
Internet	  for	  news	  and	  reports	  of	  suspicious	  disease	  events	  all	  around	  the	  world.	  Human	  
inquiry	  and	  computerized	  text	  mining	  are	  used	  to	  filter,	  organize	  and	  categorize	  the	  more	  
than	  18,000	  items	  it	  picks	  up	  every	  day,	  of	  which	  around	  200	  merit	  further	  investigation	  by	  
WHO.	  This	  sensitive	  early-­‐warning	  system	  introduced	  in	  1997	  allows	  WHO	  to	  move	  from	  
the	  conventional	  case	  report	  system,	  passively	  relying	  on	  official	  government	  notifications	  
to	  a	  proactive	  role	  in	  collecting	  data	  and	  issuing	  early	  alerts.	   	  
To	  expand	  and	  formalize	  the	  response	  capacity,	  the	  Global	  Outbreak	  Alert	  and	  Response	  
Network	  (GOARN)	  was	  set	  up	  in	  early	  2000.	  This	  overarching	  network	  links	  more	  than	  
hundred	  technical	  and	  operational	  resources	  from	  scientific	  institutions	  in	  Member	  States	  
and	  a	  wide	  selection	  of	  networks	  of	  laboratories.	  WHO	  utilized	  resources	  from	  the	  network	  
to	  coordinates	  global	  outbreak	  responses	  and	  also	  provided	  secretarial	  support	  for	  the	  
network.	  GOARN	  has	  helped	  to	  build	  consensus	  on	  guiding	  principles	  and	  standards	  for	  
global	  outbreak	  alert	  and	  streamlined	  administrative	  processes	  to	  ensure	  rapid	  
mobilization.	  (Davies,	  2008)	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   Original	  resources	  in	  Chinese.	  http://www.qianlong.com/3413/2003-­‐6-­‐17/225@901726.htm	  
	  Figure	  2	  Worldwide	  Distributions	  of	  GOARN	  Partner	  Institutions	  and	  Networks9	  
The	  SARS	  outbreak	  in	  2003	  was	  a	  sharp	  reality	  check	  on	  the	  accountability	  and	  capacity	  of	  
WHO,	  the	  main	  fighter	  of	  SARS,	  has	  demonstrated	  its	  leadership	  capacity	  in	  facing	  with	  this	  
new	  global	  threat.	  (Heymann,	  2004a;	  Heymann,	  2004b)	  Efforts	  from	  thousands	  of	  brave	  
fighters	  have	  marked	  its	  incremental	  legitimacy	  in	  maintaining	  international	  health	  security.	  
For	  further	  research	  and	  analysis,	  the	  role	  and	  impact	  of	  WHO	  during	  SARS	  epidemics	  in	  
terms	  of	  public	  health	  measures	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  six	  categories.	   	  
• Global	  alerts	  
• Travel	  advisory	  
• Mobilizing	  global	  resources	  
• Produce	  health	  guidelines	  and	  standards	  
• Technical	  and	  material	  support	  
• WHO	  and	  nation	  states	  
Role1:	  Global	  Alerts	  
Information	  management	  and	  dissemination	  are	  vital	  in	  raising	  alerts	  as	  well	  as	  stopping	  
the	  circulation	  of	  rumors	  during	  disease	  outbreaks.	  On	  March	  12,	  2003,	  WHO	  issued	  its	  first	  
global	  alert	  about	  atypical	  pneumonia	  given	  increasing	  concerns	  about	  the	  evolving	  
outbreak	  in	  Hanoi,	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Guangdong.	  Since	  March	  16,	  WHO	  maintained	  its	  daily	  
disease	  outbreak	  updates.	  Until	  July	  5	  when	  the	  SARS	  outbreak	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  announced	  
to	  be	  interrupted,	  WHO	  had	  issued	  96	  updates	  in	  total.	  The	  daily	  updates	  posted	  on	  WHO’s	  
website	  were	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  recognized	  resources	  for	  the	  outbreaks	  at	  that	  time.	  Other	  
resources	  maintained	  by	  WHO	  which	  were	  largely	  consulted	  by	  local	  government	  and	  
health	  officials	  and	  the	  general	  public	  were	  the	  table	  of	  Cumulative	  Number	  of	  Reported	  
Suspect	  and	  Probably	  Cases	  of	  SARS	  and	  list	  of	  Affected	  Areas	  of	  SARS.	  In	  many	  of	  the	  
SARS-­‐affected	  areas,	  following	  news	  and	  monitoring	  the	  SARS	  epidemic	  on	  the	  WHO	  
website	  were	  added	  as	  another	  item	  in	  their	  daily	  routine.	  (WHO,	  2003)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   ‘WHO	  |	  Global	  Outbreak	  Alert	  &	  Response	  Network’,	  WHO,	  n.d.,	  
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/.	  
Role2:	  Travel	  Advisory	  
In	  the	  great	  context	  of	  globalization,	  a	  closely	  interdependent	  and	  highly	  mobile	  world	  
through	  modern	  transportation	  has	  largely	  favored	  the	  spread	  of	  contagious	  diseases.	  The	  
international	  transmission	  occurred	  through	  flights	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  every	  country	  
with	  an	  international	  airport	  was	  at	  risk	  of	  importing	  the	  disease.	  Near	  the	  end	  of	  March,	  
WHO	  recommended	  screening	  procedure	  at	  airports	  for	  passengers	  departing	  from	  areas	  
with	  recent	  local	  transmission,	  and	  issued	  guidance	  to	  airlines	  on	  steps	  to	  take	  should	  a	  
suspected	  case	  be	  detected	  in	  flight.	  (Bell,	  2004)	  These	  preventive	  measures	  were	  shown	  to	  
be	  an	  outstanding	  success.	  No	  cases	  of	  suspected	  in-­‐flight	  transmission	  were	  reported	  
following	  the	  issue	  of	  advice.	  As	  the	  situation	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  deteriorated	  and	  several	  areas	  
linked	  their	  first	  imported	  cases	  to	  a	  history	  of	  travel	  in	  Guangdong	  or	  Hong	  Kong,	  WHO	  
urgently	  issued	  the	  toughest	  travel	  advisories	  in	  its	  55-­‐year	  history	  when	  it	  recommended	  
“postponement	  of	  all	  but	  essential	  travel”	  to	  designated	  high-­‐risk	  areas.	  (Fidler,	  2007)	  
Role	  3:	  Mobilizing	  Global	  Resources	  
As	  the	  premier	  international	  health	  institution,	  WHO	  enjoys	  a	  prime	  capacity	  in	  mobilizing	  
international	  resources.	  Thanks	  to	  this,	  WHO	  was	  able	  to	  coordinating	  and	  setting	  up	  
extensive	  networks	  and	  calling	  on	  a	  collaborative	  approach	  to	  fight	  against	  global	  
epidemics.	   	  
Based	  on	  the	  model	  of	  its	  electronically	  interconnected	  global	  influenza	  network,	  on	  March	  
17,	  the	  Organization	  was	  able	  to	  quickly	  create	  a	  similar	  network	  of	  11	  leading	  laboratories	  
in	  9	  countries,	  consisting	  of	  major	  research	  institutes	  in	  industrialized	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  
key	  laboratories	  in	  infected	  areas.	  The	  laboratory	  reagents	  needed	  to	  standardize	  and	  
assure	  the	  quality	  of	  laboratory	  tests	  were	  being	  made	  available	  by	  WHO,	  at	  no	  cost,	  to	  
designated	  laboratories.	  Samples	  from	  one	  and	  the	  same	  patient	  can	  be	  analyzed	  in	  parallel	  
in	  several	  laboratories	  and	  results	  are	  shared	  among	  network	  members	  in	  real	  time	  on	  the	  
secure	  WHO	  website.	  Similar	  networks	  were	  formed	  subsequently	  on	  March	  20	  to	  address	  
the	  clinical	  aspects	  (78	  clinicians	  in	  9	  countries)	  and	  on	  March	  28	  to	  deal	  with	  epidemiology	  
of	  the	  outbreaks	  (9	  sites	  in	  9	  countries).	  (WHO,	  2006)	   	  
On	  April	  17,	  just	  a	  month	  after	  its	  establishment,	  the	  laboratory	  network	  announced	  
conclusive	  identification	  of	  the	  SARS	  causative	  agent:	  a	  new	  coronavirus	  unlike	  any	  other	  
known	  human	  or	  animal	  virus	  in	  its	  family.	  On	  May	  4,	  network	  scientists	  released	  the	  first	  
results	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  survival	  time	  of	  the	  SARS	  virus	  on	  various	  environmental	  surfaces	  
and	  in	  various	  body	  specimens.10	   From	  May	  16	  to	  17,	  WHO	  convened	  the	  first	  
international	  consultation	  on	  the	  global	  epidemiology	  of	  SARS	  and	  produced	  a	  state-­‐of-­‐the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




art	  consensus	  document	  on	  the	  status	  of	  current	  knowledge	  to	  guide	  firm	  policy	  
recommendations	  for	  containment	  and	  control.	   	  
Role	  4:	  Produce	  Health	  Guidelines	  and	  Standards	  
When	  WHO	  alerted	  the	  world	  of	  the	  SARS	  outbreak	  on	  March	  12,	  2003,	  virtually	  nothing	  
was	  known	  about	  the	  new	  disease.	  It	  did	  not	  even	  have	  a	  name.	  No	  conventional	  
treatments	  worked.	  Explosive	  spread	  from	  patients	  to	  healthcare	  workers,	  to	  a	  large	  scale	  
further	  undermined	  the	  local	  medical	  surge	  capacity.	  How	  the	  disease	  came	  to	  be	  and	  how	  
it	  was	  developing,	  were	  also	  unknown.	  The	  only	  thing	  without	  doubt	  was	  that	  it	  would	  go	  
on	  spreading	  around	  the	  world.	   	   On	  March	  15,	  2003,	  WHO	  issued	  its	  second,	  stronger	  
global	  alert,	  and	  promptly	  issued	  case	  definitions	  and	  reporting	  requirements,	  as	  well	  as	  
tools	  for	  their	  implementation,	  and	  began	  reporting	  cases	  and	  assessments	  of	  the	  evolving	  
state	  daily	  on	  its	  website.	  
As	  with	  any	  other	  disease	  outbreak,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  setting	  up	  a	  surveillance	  system	  is	  to	  
establish	  standard	  case	  definitions.	  When	  WHO	  issued	  its	  second	  alert	  on	  March	  15,	  2003,	  
the	  case	  definitions	  were	  simple	  compared	  with	  the	  final	  version	  revised	  in	  late	  May.	  
Abundant	  additional	  support	  was	  available	  to	  all	  through	  information	  posted	  at	  the	  WHO	  
website.	  Guidance	  ranged	  in	  nature	  from	  forms	  for	  collecting	  and	  reporting	  data,	  through	  
guidelines	  for	  clinical	  management	  and	  infection	  control	  in	  hospitals,	  to	  the	  instructions	  for	  
local	  production	  of	  diagnostic	  tests.	   11Although	  these	  standards	  and	  guidelines	  were	  
restrained	  at	  the	  very	  beginning,	  they	  have	  largely	  helped	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  transmission	  of	  
disease,	  especially	  among	  healthcare	  workers.	  Hospitals	  that	  detected	  possible	  cases	  
followed	  WHO’s	  advice	  to	  isolate	  patients	  and	  manage	  them	  according	  to	  strict	  procedures	  
of	  epidemic	  control.	   	   	  
Role	  5:	  Technical	  and	  Material	  Assistance	  
During	  the	  SARS	  outbreaks,	  WHO	  were	  committed	  to	  provide	  technical	  and	  material	  
assistance	  by	  “sending	  teams	  of	  experts	  and	  specialized	  protective	  equipment	  for	  infection	  
control	  in	  hard-­‐hit	  hospitals	  to	  countries	  requesting	  such	  assistance.”12	   All	  the	  countries	  
affected	  by	  SARS	  received	  some	  level	  of	  support	  from	  WHO	  and	  were	  under	  the	  
coordination	  of	  WHO	  to	  fight	  SARS	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	   	  
Vietnam	  was	  the	  first	  country	  to	  be	  announced	  SARS-­‐free	  by	  WHO.	  It	  was	  removed	  from	  
the	  list	  of	  countries	  with	  local	  transmission	  of	  SARS	  on	  April	  28,	  2003,	  two	  months	  after	  the	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Hanoi	  index	  case	  was	  hospitalized.13	   The	  success	  in	  Vietnam	  was	  particularly	  significant	  
and	  encouraging,	  as	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  four	  countries	  WHO	  initially	  identified	  as	  having	  local	  
transmission	  of	  SARS	  on	  March	  15,	  2003.	  It	  also	  demonstrated	  how	  WHO’s	  strong	  and	  
timely	  support	  can	  help	  nations	  win	  over	  the	  disease.	  WHO	  had	  collaborated	  closely	  with	  
the	  Vietnamese	  government	  to	  tackle	  the	  outbreak	  since	  SARS	  was	  first	  detected	  in	  Hanoi.	  
Early	  alert	  issued	  by	  Dr.	  Carlo	  Urbani,	  WHO’s	  communicable	  disease	  specialist	  in	  Vietnam	  
led	  to	  rapid	  actions	  from	  the	  government.	  Since	  the	  step-­‐in	  of	  WHO	  experts,	  they	  made	  
recommendations	  on	  early	  investigation,	  immediate	  implementation	  of	  control	  measures,	  
rigid	  contact	  tracing,	  laboratory	  references	  etc.	  By	  March	  16,	  a	  nine-­‐person	  international	  
team	  was	  in	  place	  at	  the	  WHO	  Vietnam	  Office	  to	  help	  investigate	  and	  control	  the	  outbreak.	  
As	  advised	  and	  supported	  by	  WHO,	  Vietnam	  was	  able	  to	  set	  up	  a	  high-­‐level	  SARS	  Task	  Force	  
within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  and	  a	  national	  inter-­‐sectorial	  Steering	  Committee	  for	  SARS	  
control	  at	  the	  very	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  outbreak.	  (WHO	  2006)	  
Thanks	  to	  the	  prompt	  and	  determinant	  actions	  including	  early	  identification	  of	  the	  
outbreak,	  the	  consolidation	  of	  SARS	  patients	  in	  a	  single	  hospital,	  strict	  infection	  control,	  
persistent	  contact	  tracing,	  and	  thorough	  investigation	  of	  all	  rumored	  cases,	  Vietnam	  
reported	  only	  a	  total	  of	  63	  SARS	  cases	  and	  5	  deaths.	  Evidence	  from	  SARS	  control	  in	  Vietnam	  
has	  shown	  that	  local	  and	  national	  capacities	  can	  be	  assisted	  by	  WHO	  coordinated	  networks.	  
The	  additional	  technical	  and	  material	  resources	  offer	  adequate	  support	  during	  times	  of	  
public	  health	  emergencies.	  The	  assistance	  provided	  by	  WHO	  and	  its	  distribution	  networks	  
strengthens	  the	  surge	  capacity	  in	  preparing	  and	  responding	  to	  future	  infectious	  disease	  
threats	  through	  a	  global	  alert	  and	  response	  system.	  The	  SARS	  experience	  in	  Vietnam	  has	  
also	  shown	  that	  rapid	  political	  commitment	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  can	  be	  crucial.	  “Vietnam	  
demonstrated	  to	  the	  world	  how	  a	  developing	  country,	  hit	  by	  an	  especially	  severe	  outbreak,	  
can	  triumph	  over	  a	  disease	  when	  reporting	  is	  prompt	  and	  open	  when	  WHO	  assistance	  is	  
quickly	  requested	  and	  fully	  supported,	  and	  when	  rapid	  case	  detection,	  immediate	  isolation	  
and	  infection	  control,	  and	  vigorous	  contact	  tracing	  are	  put	  in	  place.”	  (WHO,	  2006)	  
Role	  6:	  Soft	  Power	  over	  Nation	  States	  
China,	  the	  epicenter	  of	  the	  disease	  outbreak	  joined	  the	  fight	  against	  the	  epidemic	  fairly	  
late.	  Since	  the	  earliest	  sporadic	  and	  localized	  outbreaks	  in	  southeast	  China,	  WHO	  has	  been	  
networking	  with	  officials	  and	  sending	  queries	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  for	  more	  
information.	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  sensitive	  political	  situation	  in	  China	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  failed	  
to	  respond	  quickly	  and	  contain	  the	  disease	  inside	  its	  border.	  During	  this	  difficult	  time,	  WHO	  
approached	  China	  several	  times	  by	  ways	  of	  telephone	  calls,	  letters,	  and	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  
encounters,	  including	  a	  tense	  meeting	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  when	  WHO’s	  Regional	  Director	  for	  the	  
Western	  Pacific	  pressed	  China’s	  Minister	  of	  Health	  for	  more	  information	  and	  access	  to	  
Guangdong	  Province.	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The	  changing	  attitude	  of	  Chinese	  governments	  and	  its	  willingness	  to	  open-­‐up	  and	  to	  
cooperate	  was	  accompanied	  with	  the	  increasing	  international	  pressure	  and	  the	  realization	  
of	  the	  severity	  of	  SARS	  around	  the	  world	  when	  WHO	  kept	  issuing	  world	  alerts.	  Travel	  
advisory	  was	  for	  the	  first	  time	  demonstrated	  as	  a	  successful	  soft	  power	  to	  compel	  countries	  
to	  follow,	  in	  this	  case	  China,	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  obligations	  in	  maintaining	  international	  health	  
security.	  At	  one	  time,	  more	  than	  100	  countries	  imposed	  travel	  restrictions	  to	  mainland	  
China	  after	  WHO	  issued	  its	  travel	  advisory	  to	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  other	  major	  cities	  in	  mainland	  
China.	  The	  Chinese	  government,	  afraid	  of	  a	  risk	  of	  trade	  block	  and	  economic	  recession,	  
changed	  from	  the	  most	  murky	  government	  to	  the	  one	  desperately	  sought	  affirmation	  from	  
WHO	  that	  it	  was	  on	  the	  right	  track	  towards	  containing	  the	  disease.	  Since	  late	  March,	  WHO	  
was	  able	  to	  markedly	  increase	  its	  presence	  and	  influence	  in	  China.	  Having	  realized	  the	  
paramount	  importance	  of	  combating	  SARS,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  made	  an	  
unprecedented	  move.	  It	  began	  to	  enhance	  its	  collaboration	  with	  WHO	  and	  eagerly	  seek	  for	  
assistance.	  It	  not	  only	  relaxed	  visa	  authorization	  procedures	  for	  WHO	  experts	  but	  also	  held	  
a	  briefing	  session	  together	  with	  WHO	  investigation	  teams.	  (Abraham,	  2004,	  p.	  180)	  In	  late	  
March,	  Chinese	  authorities	  issued	  updated	  information	  on	  cases	  and	  deaths	  for	  the	  
previously	  reported	  outbreak	  of	  atypical	  pneumonia	  in	  Guangdong	  Province.	   14	   Chinese	  
scientists,	  epidemiologists,	  and	  clinicians	  also	  became	  full	  partners	  in	  the	  three	  working	  
groups	  that	  were	  studying	  SARS.	  On	  April	  2,	  a	  WHO	  five-­‐person	  team	  was	  given	  permission	  
to	  travel	  to	  Guangdong	  Province	  to	  confer	  with	  officials	  there	  about	  the	  SARS	  outbreak.	  The	  
Chinese	  government	  gave	  highest	  priority	  to	  the	  SARS	  response	  and	  declared	  a	  “people’s	  
war”	  against	  SARS.	  On	  May	  15,	  2003,	  China’s	  Xinhua	  New	  Agency	  quoted	  Premier	  Wen	  
Jiabao’s	  address	  at	  a	  Cabinet	  meeting,	  “no	  individual	  or	  administration	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  
tamper	  with	  or	  delay	  the	  reporting	  of	  information”.	   15Over	  300	  Communist	  Party	  and	  
government	  officials	  had	  been	  fired	  or	  punished	  for	  delaying	  the	  release	  of	  figures.	  State	  
media	  also	  publicized	  a	  warning	  by	  China’s	  Supreme	  Court	  that	  those	  who	  caused	  death	  or	  
severe	  illness	  by	  deliberately	  spreading	  SARS	  could	  face	  a	  prison	  term	  or	  possible	  
execution.	  Quarantine	  violators	  could	  be	  jailed	  for	  up	  to	  seven	  years.	   16From	  late	  May,	  
when	  SARS	  had	  been	  contained	  in	  countries	  like	  Singapore	  which	  were	  the	  earliest	  hit	  areas	  
of	  SARS,	  WHO	  started	  to	  put	  more	  efforts	  in	  China.	  On	  June	  13,	  the	  Organization	  started	  
publishing	  data	  and	  maps	  of	  current	  probable	  cases	  in	  China	  provided	  by	  the	  Chinese	  
Ministry	  of	  Health.	  
Implications	  of	  a	  shared	  health	  governance	  structure	  
The	  success	  in	  containing	  SARS	  was	  a	  story	  of	  allied	  commitments	  and	  decisive	  actions	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which	  provide	  governance	  implications	  under	  a	  shared	  health	  governance	  structure.	  (WHO,	  
2003a;	  WHO,	  2003b)	  
From	  a	  pure	  technical	  standing	  point,	  Chinese	  government	  was	  supposed	  to	  capable	  of	  
fulfilling	  its	  role	  in	  securing	  health	  of	  its	  citizens.	  Through	  years	  of	  construct,	  China	  has	  build	  
up	  a	  disease	  surveillance	  system	  to	  detect	  and	  monitor	  disease	  outbreaks.	  The	  local	  health	  
agencies	  in	  Guangdong	  were	  able	  to	  detect	  the	  cases	  and	  the	  ministry	  of	  health	  
coordinated	  panel	  developed	  an	  early	  case	  definition	  which	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  consistent	  
with	  the	  following	  WHO’s	  version.	  (Abraham,	  2004)	  A	  group	  of	  Chinese	  scientist	  was	  also	  
able	  to	  identify	  the	  virus	  of	  the	  infectious	  agents	  even	  before	  WHO	  convened	  its	  global	  
laboratory	  network	  however	  unfortunately	  the	  result	  went	  unpublished.	  (Abraham,	  2004)	  
With	  a	  robust	  security	  system	  accompanied	  with	  a	  strong	  will	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem,	  
the	  country	  was	  able	  to	  hold	  its	  citizens	  accountable	  by	  issuing	  and	  implementing	  strict	  
quarantine	  and	  isolation	  policies.	   	  
However,	  China	  as	  the	  major	  country	  affected	  by	  the	  diseases	  failed	  to	  stand	  on	  its	  role	  in	  
protecting	  health	  for	  its	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  the	  world	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  political	  
irresponsibility	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  had	  made	  us	  miss	  the	  gold	  window	  to	  contain	  
the	  virus	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  before	  it	  became	  an	  alarming	  global	  epidemic.	  The	  cover-­‐up	  
strategies	  and	  denial	  of	  independent	  audition	  and	  investment	  has	  endangered	  authentic	  
collaboration.	  China	  recognized	  the	  importance	  of	  containing	  infectious	  diseases	  at	  an	  early	  
stage.	  However,	  due	  to	  competitive	  priorities,	  China	  failed	  to	  act	  consistently	  to	  remain	  
cautious	  about	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  unpreparedness	  at	  the	  
beginning	  of	  SARS	  epidemic.	   	   It	  underlines	  an	  approach	  of	  measuring	  cost-­‐benefit	  before	  
taking	  actions.	  After	  SARS,	  preventing	  and	  controlling	  epidemics	  have	  moved	  to	  the	  top	  
priorities	  of	  the	  government.	  The	  central	  government	  has	  shown	  its	  determination	  to	  
improve	  public	  health	  emergency	  systems	  and	  prevent	  similar	  catastrophes	  from	  
happening	  again	  in	  the	  future.	  During	  the	  H5N1,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  was	  able	  to	  
respond	  in	  a	  swift	  and	  decisive	  manner.	  On	  the	  global	  level,	  global	  outbreaks	  control	  has	  
sustained	  top	  on	  the	  list	  of	  WHO	  agenda.	  The	  severity	  of	  SARS	  has	  increased	  awareness	  of	  
urgency	  in	  addressing	  emerging	  and	  reemerging	  infectious	  disease	  problems.	  SARS	  has	  
served	  as	  a	  leverage	  point	  in	  promoting	  the	  internalization	  and	  pushing	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  
shared	  values	  that	  containing	  infectious	  disease	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  everyone,	  and	  without	  
collaboration	  and	  cooperation,	  success	  is	  hard.	  (Fidler,	  2004a;	  Fidler,	  2004b;	  Fidler,	  2009)	  
The	  WHO	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  nailing	  down	  the	  success	  by	  performing	  the	  six	  roles	  
discussed	  above.	  It	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  global	  
infectious	  disease	  control.	  (WHO,	  2002;	  WHO,	  2004)	  WHO’s	  role	  in	  containing	  SARS	  and	  
other	  infectious	  outbreaks	  is	  more	  like	  a	  moderator	  and	  coordinator,	  by	  providing	  
information	  and	  assistance	  to	  where	  they	  are	  needed.	  “Countries	  experiencing	  outbreaks	  
often	  approach	  WHO	  for	  assistance	  as	  the	  first	  point	  of	  call-­‐this	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  a	  global	  
equivalent	  of	  dialing	  911	  in	  an	  emergency.	  WHO	  then	  acts	  as	  a	  facilitator	  as	  it	  has	  the	  
capacity,	  knowledge,	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  assemble	  the	  most	  appropriate	  people	  to	  assist	  with	  
the	  disease	  outbreak	  in	  question”	  (Zacher,	  chp3,	  p51)	  Usually	  when	  a	  country	  is	  unable	  to	  
handle	  the	  outbreak,	  they	  will	  call	  on	  the	  international	  community	  for	  assistance.	  During	  
the	  SARS	  epidemic,	  the	  laboratory	  network	  run	  by	  WHO	  played	  notable	  roles	  in	  containing	  
the	  virus.	  WHO’s	  success	  in	  aggregating	  such	  a	  network	  is	  compelling	  evidence	  of	  its	  ability	  
to	  organize	  and	  coordinate	  resources.	  
However	  despite	  all	  the	  fantastic	  stories	  and	  honors,	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  SARS	  epidemic	  
is	  expected	  to	  produce	  particular	  concerns	  for	  future	  governance	  of	  global	  epidemic	  
epidemics	  under	  the	  shared	  health	  governance	  system.	  
First,	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  China	  is	  unique	  from	  both	  political	  and	  cultural	  
perspectives.	  Not	  only	  does	  China	  has	  a	  relatively	  well-­‐developed	  healthcare	  system	  which	  
sustained	  as	  the	  guts	  to	  fight	  against	  diseases,	  but	  also	  does	  the	  country	  has	  distinct	  
political	  culture.	  The	  government	  has	  resumed	  supreme	  power	  of	  governance	  which	  has	  
been	  demonstrated	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  issue	  strict	  quarantine	  policies	  and	  ensure	  enforcement	  
through	  its	  security	  system.	  More	  importantly	  is	  the	  enormous	  amount	  of	  resources	  the	  
country	  was	  able	  to	  mobilize	  in	  front	  of	  an	  emergency.	  It	  is	  literally	  impossible	  in	  any	  other	  
countries	  in	  the	  world	  where	  the	  government	  can	  gather	  resources	  and	  create	  a	  hospital	  
within	  10	  days.	  This	  then	  implies	  a	  risk	  that	  when	  this	  kind	  of	  miracle	  stories	  will	  not	  exist,	  
the	  duty	  and	  responsibility	  of	  WHO	  shall	  be	  increased.	  Or	  if	  SARS	  would	  have	  occurred	  in	  
fragile	  African	  countries	  rather	  than	  Singapore,	  Canada	  and	  China	  where	  healthcare	  
systems	  are	  comparatively	  well	  developed,	  we	  might	  have	  faced	  a	  totally	  different	  story.	   	  
Secondly,	  SARS	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  decisive	  actions	  of	  nation	  states	  can	  change	  history	  
and	  how	  critical	  that	  states	  should	  maintain	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  dealing	  with	  global	  health	  
epidemics.	  Evidence	  from	  the	  case	  of	  SARS	  has	  shown	  that,	  states	  and	  WHO	  have	  different	  
scales	  of	  size	  and	  varied	  roles	  in	  preparedness	  and	  response	  to	  global	  epidemics.	  For	  
instance,	  in	  detecting	  outbreaks	  and	  conducting	  surveillance,	  the	  surveillance	  system	  in	  
WHO	  is	  primarily	  relied	  on	  the	  data	  collected	  through	  national	  surveillance	  networks.	  In	  
order	  to	  address	  the	  threat	  of	  transnational	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  effectively,	  
accurate	  information	  and	  accountable	  domestic	  surveillance	  systems	  are	  critical.	  The	  
success	  of	  containing	  infectious	  disease	  transmission	  relies	  mainly	  on	  early	  detection	  of	  the	  
onset	  of	  possible	  symptoms,	  followed	  by	  rapid	  response	  with	  infection	  control	  measures	  
including	  isolation	  and	  quarantine.	  The	  health	  department	  of	  the	  country	  where	  an	  
outbreak	  occurs	  is	  often	  the	  first	  to	  know	  about	  the	  disease.	  Monitoring	  disease	  
transmission	  requires	  and	  is	  strongly	  dependent	  on	  local	  and	  national	  systems.	  The	  
capability	  and	  capacity	  of	  a	  government	  in	  containing	  infectious	  disease	  outbreaks	  largely	  
depends	  on	  the	  network	  and	  relative	  powers	  of	  the	  government	  administrative	  divisions	  
and	  their	  subordinate	  public	  health	  and	  CDC	  offices.	  (Schwartz	  2010)	   	   The	  thrilling	  success	  
of	  the	  global	  laboratory	  network	  on	  one	  hand	  prove	  WHO’s	  capacity	  in	  aggregating	  
resources,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  implies	  the	  importance	  of	  nation	  states’	  substantial	  
support	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  routine	  work	  and	  development	  of	  these	  laboratories.	   	  
Thirdly,	  some	  scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  response	  of	  SARS	  is	  valid	  but	  not	  fast	  enough.	  
The	  challenges	  of	  fast	  action	  and	  responses	  may	  remain	  on	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  most	  disease	  
outbreaks.	  In	  many	  cases,	  accurate	  information	  is	  not	  available	  or	  ambitious	  and	  
incomplete,	  which	  creates	  unique	  challenges	  for	  governance	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  Usually	  
the	  immediate	  threat	  demands	  an	  immediate	  response	  yet	  disease	  comes	  with	  scientific	  
complexity	  that	  requires	  lengthy	  research	  and	  analysis	  to	  understand.	  Therefore,	  action	  
always	  brings	  its	  own	  risks.	  (Kahn,	  2009,	  p.	  81)	  How	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  a	  risk	  
of	  overreaction	  is	  critical	  in	  reaching	  agreements	  and	  calling	  for	  decisive	  responses.	  
Balancing	  anxiety	  and	  risk	  is	  always	  a	  long	  learning	  process	  however	  beyond	  acknowledging	  
the	  importance	  of	  dealing	  with	  threats,	  it	  is	  also,	  to	  some	  extent,	  crucial	  to	  accept	  the	  
necessity	  of	  overreacting	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  panic	  within	  control	  will	  
reward	  in	  preventing	  more	  devastating	  catastrophes.	  This	  concept	  should	  but	  has	  not	  been	  
integrated	  into	  the	  normative	  framework	  and	  fully	  realized	  by	  all	  its	  members.	  It	  is	  obvious	  
to	  be	  a	  more	  complicated	  process,	  as	  there	  will	  be	  conflicts	  between	  short-­‐term	  benefits	  
and	  long-­‐term	  interests.	  Usually	  quick	  responses	  under	  uncertainty	  mean	  you	  are	  putting	  
your	  short-­‐term	  economic	  interests	  at	  risk	  however	  the	  benefits	  of	  decisive	  action	  are	  also	  
evident:	  you	  are	  doing	  long-­‐term	  investment	  to	  prevent	  the	  diseases	  from	  spreading	  and	  
out-­‐of-­‐control.	  But	  by	  reiterating	  the	  principles	  that	  fear	  is	  better	  than	  death,	  WHO	  will	  
have	  to	  push	  the	  internalization	  of	  accepting	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  outbreaks	  and	  responding	  
decisively	  with	  its	  continued	  efforts	  of	  education,	  deliberation	  and	  patient	  diplomacy.	   	  
Fourthly,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  global	  health	  constitution	  as	  the	  guiding	  principle	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
SARS	  epidemic.	  The	  International	  Health	  Regulation	  was	  not	  working	  at	  that	  time	  given	  its	  
limitations	  on	  disease	  coverage	  and	  lack	  of	  clear	  role	  definition	  of	  key	  actors.	  (Taylor,	  2002)	   	  
The	  new	  International	  Health	  Regulation	  is	  revised	  in	  2005,	  more	  specific	  responsibilities	  
have	  been	  allocated	  to	  the	  two	  actors,	  for	  instance,	  states	  are	  responsible	  to	  build	  up	  a	  
solid	  state-­‐based	  surveillance	  and	  alert	  system.	  (Wilson,	  2005)	  According	  the	  new	  
International	  Health	  Regulation,	  improvements	  in	  the	  capacity	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  
surveillance	  systems	  by	  incorporating	  real-­‐time	  event	  management	  system	  become	  a	  
substantial	  requirement	  for	  the	  member	  states.	  (Baker	  &	  Fidler,	  2006)	  It	  is	  required	  that	  
member	  states	  have	  to	  assess	  their	  core	  capacity	  for	  effective	  public	  health	  surveillance	  
and	  response	  within	  2	  years	  and	  meet	  requirements	  for	  core	  capacity	  within	  the	  
subsequent	  3	  years.	  (Wilson,	  2008)	  Currently,	  the	  International	  Health	  Regulation	  serves	  as	  
a	  basis	  for	  WHO	  to	  further	  develop	  a	  Global	  Health	  Constitution.	  It	  has	  established	  a	  
structural	  framework	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  controlling	  global	  epidemics	  and	  allocated	  
duties	  and	  powers	  to	  nation	  states	  and	  WHO.	  However	  there	  are	  still	  a	  lot	  that	  have	  been	  
left	  out	  for	  instance	  WHO’s	  power	  is	  not	  legitimately	  conceptualized	  as	  it	  is	  limited	  in	  
mitigating	  disputes	  and	  pressure	  its	  member	  states	  for	  action.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  
short-­‐handed	  constitution	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  unclearly	  shared	  values	  and	  poor	  
internalization	  of	  relevant	  concepts	  among	  member	  states.	  Literally,	  the	  Global	  Health	  
Constitution	  comes	  at	  last	  to	  contextualize	  all	  the	  elements	  in	  the	  shared	  governance	  
scheme.	  In	  a	  theoretically	  perfect	  world,	  the	  Constitution	  will	  do	  nothing	  more	  than	  as	  
documentation	  since	  every	  member	  in	  the	  system	  is	  binded	  with	  a	  number	  of	  ethical	  
standards	  and	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  accountable	  and	  responsible	  for	  its	  assigned	  duties.	  
However	  in	  reality	  when	  competing	  strategies	  do	  exist	  and	  the	  internalization	  of	  moral	  
standards	  usually	  takes	  time,	  the	  Constitution	  would	  serve	  as	  both	  a	  guide	  and	  facilitator	  
for	  members	  to	  internalize	  the	  shared	  principles	  and	  a	  binding	  power	  for	  every	  player	  to	  
fulfill	  its	  obligations.	  As	  contracting	  a	  global	  health	  constitution	  is	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  shared	  
health	  governance,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  drafted	  constitution	  will	  be	  largely	  dependent	  
on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  normative	  framework	  and	  a	  functional	  approach	  to	  responsibility	  
allocation.	  As	  that	  said,	  the	  revised	  International	  Health	  Regulation	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  
further	  develop	  a	  true	  global	  health	  constitution,	  but	  it	  will	  largely	  depend	  on	  what	  and	  
how	  WHO	  can	  adapt	  to	  pin	  down	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  obligations	  and	  normative	  rules	  to	  share	  
with	  and	  make	  them	  internalized	  among	  its	  member	  states	  through	  continual	  deliberation	  
and	  patient	  diplomacy.	  
CONCLUSIONS	  AND	  RECOMMENDATIONS	  
The	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme	  begins	  with	  a	  universal	  ethical	  principle	  that	  
preventing	  health	  insecurity	  and	  containing	  epidemics	  are	  a	  general	  moral	  obligation	  and	  
incorporated	  interest	  of	  all	  therefore	  shall	  be	  embodied	  as	  a	  social	  value	  shared	  by	  every	  
individual,	  nation	  states	  and	  international	  institutions.	  With	  this	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  duties	  
are	  not	  dumped	  but	  functionally	  granted	  based	  on	  voluntary	  commitments	  and	  functional	  
requirements	  of	  nation	  states	  and	  global	  actors.	  A	  Global	  Health	  Constitution	  comes	  at	  last	  
to	  document	  and	  contextualize	  the	  shared	  norms	  and	  allocated	  responsibilities	  and	  it	  also	  
serves	  as	  an	  end	  as	  well	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  to	  further	  elaboration	  and	  refinement	  of	  the	  
normative	  framework.	  The	  scheme	  not	  only	  follows	  a	  logical	  flow	  from	  ideas,	  to	  responses	  
and	  actions	  and	  finally	  archives	  of	  accountable	  regulations	  but	  also	  ensures	  a	  sustainable	  
development	  and	  self-­‐evolving	  potential	  of	  the	  governance	  structure.	  Given	  the	  
always-­‐imperfect	  reality,	  sustainability	  is	  essential	  to	  strengthen	  our	  strategies	  to	  address	  
both	  current	  challenges	  and	  further	  threats.	  
Based	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  shared	  health	  governance	  scheme,	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  nation	  
states	  and	  WHO	  shall	  be	  clear-­‐cut,	  distinguished	  and	  complementary.	  The	  SARS	  case	  has	  
shown	  that	  the	  role	  of	  nation	  states	  and	  WHO	  are	  somewhat	  complementary	  which	  
suggests	  that	  shared	  health	  governance	  structure	  leading	  by	  the	  WHO,	  centered	  around	  
nation	  states	  could	  be	  a	  viable	  solution	  for	  future	  epidemic	  control.	  The	  success	  also	  
proved	  that	  a	  managed	  and	  well-­‐coordinated	  global	  partnership	  under	  shared	  health	  
governance	  framework	  will	  work.	  However,	  evidence	  from	  SARS	  has	  shown	  that	  both	  WHO	  
and	  national	  governments	  have	  unfulfilled	  roles.	  To	  fully	  realize	  the	  shared	  health	  
governance	  structure,	  one	  would	  require	  both	  actors	  devote	  more	  efforts	  and	  further	  
enhance	  their	  performances.	  
For	  nation	  states,	  financing	  and	  funding	  to	  strengthen	  the	  health	  surveillance	  is	  essential	  
for	  future	  rapid	  detection	  and	  responses	  of	  outbreaks	  and	  public	  health	  emergencies.	  As	  a	  
political	  unit,	  governments	  shall	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  reducing	  infectious	  disease	  
spreading	  and	  internalize	  it	  as	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  protect	  its	  own	  citizens	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
world	  population.	   	  
For	  WHO,	  it	  is	  a	  top	  priority	  to	  propose	  comprehensive	  collaboration	  on	  containing	  global	  
epidemics	  and	  install	  it	  as	  public	  moral	  norms.	  It	  requires	  education,	  deliberation	  and	  
diplomacy	  with	  government	  officials	  to	  intensify	  the	  internalization	  of	  such	  values.	  WHO	  
shall	  also	  use	  IHR	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  draft	  the	  Global	  Health	  Constitution,	  which	  would	  endorse	  
the	  defined	  responsibilities	  of	  states	  and	  global	  agencies.	  Moreover	  it	  should	  also	  find	  itself	  
as	  a	  role	  model	  to	  fulfill	  its	  responsibility	  such	  as	  promoting	  dialogue	  and	  information	  flow	  
and	  providing	  technical	  assistance.	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